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Abstract
Using unique survey and administrative data from the Canada Student Loans Program,
we document that parental support and personal savings substantially lower student loan
repayment problems. We develop a theoretical model for studying student borrowing and
repayment in the presence of risky labor market outcomes, moral hazard, and costly earn
ings veriﬁcation. This framework demonstrates that non-monetary costs of applying for
income-based repayment assistance are critical to understanding why resources other than
earnings lead to greater repayment. We further show that eliminating these non-monetary
costs may be ineﬃcient and lead to undesirable redistribution. Empirically, we demonstrate
that expanding Canada’s income-based Repayment Assistance Plan to automatically cover
all borrowers would likely reduce program revenue by nearly one-half over early years of
repayment. Finally, we show how student loan programs can be more eﬃciently designed
to address heterogeneity in parental transfers in the presence of non-monetary earnings
veriﬁcation costs and moral hazard.
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Introduction

Recent increases in student borrowing, coupled with growing labor market risk (Moﬃtt and
Gottschalk, 2012; Lochner and Shin, 2014; Cunha and Heckman, 2016), have highlighted the
policy relevance of a key aspect of government student loan programs: their ability to provide
insurance to borrowers against adverse labor market outcomes by reducing repayment amounts
when income is low (Friedman and Kuznets, 1954; Nerlove, 1975; Chatterjee and Ionescu, 2012;
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2016). In Canada and the U.S., formal repayment assistance for
borrowers with low post-school earnings includes deferment and forbearance, as well as explicit
income-contingent repayment amounts (e.g. Pay-as-You-Earn, PAYE, in the U.S. or the Repay
ment Assistance Plan, RAP, in Canada).1
In recent years, plans incorporating repayment assistance have become substantially more
prominent. While very few Canadian and American students were enrolled in income-based re
payment plans a decade ago, by 2014, roughly one-in-four borrowers who recently entered repay
ment had enrolled in these types of plans (Government Accountability Oﬃce, 2015; Employment
and Social Development Canada, 2016). The beneﬁts of income-contingent repayment have also
served as the impetus for many recent policy proposals, with considerable interest in fully incomebased programs (like those of Australia and, recently, the United Kingdom) that automatically
reduce payments when earnings are low (Nelson, 2013).
While oﬀering important beneﬁts to many students, these formal insurance mechanisms, as
well as the informal insurance provided by the options of default and delinquency, can also
be quite costly. For example, the U.S. Department of Education expects to collect only 75
80% of any outstanding amounts when borrowers enter either income-driven repayment plans or
default (Department of Education, 2017). Since Canadian and American government student
loan programs are meant to be self-ﬁnancing, any shortfalls arising from borrowers who make
reduced payments (or default) are typically oﬀset by ‘proﬁts’ from those who are repaying in full.
In practice, student loans include an interest premium to cover the risk that many borrowers will
not fully repay.
Given the costs associated with repayment assistance and default, it is important to under
stand whether the insurance provided by current student loan programs is well-designed. Several
recent studies consider potential improvements to current student loan repayment plans (Nelson,
2013) or the optimal design of student loans under uncertainty and various market frictions (Chat
terjee and Ionescu, 2012; Gary-Bobo and Trannoy, 2015; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2016); yet,
the empirical relevance of diﬀerent frictions is largely unknown. Importantly, none of these stud
ies consider the role of one potentially crucial aspect of current programs – that a borrower’s
(and spouse’s) earnings is the only ﬁnancial resource taken into account when considering the
ability to repay. Neither the possibility of changing this aspect, nor the implications that this
1

We use the terms income-driven, income-based and income-contingent repayments interchangeably.
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aspect might have for other policy changes, has entered recent policy discussions. Yet, access to
other resources like parental transfers (including in-kind assistance such as the opportunity to
live at home) and personal savings also provides valuable insurance against adverse labor market
outcomes (Kaplan, 2012; Edwards, 2015; McGarry, 2016). Little is known about how these ad
ditional resources impact student loan repayment or their implications for the design of student
loan programs. These issues are the focus of this paper.
To study the interaction of parental support and student loan repayment, we begin by de
veloping a simple model of student borrowing, (unobserved) post-school eﬀort, and repayment
under the existing system of student loans. After borrowing for school, students must decide
between repaying their loan in full or, if eligible, applying for reduced income-based payments.
Crucially, payment reductions depend on post-school earnings but not parental transfers. A novel
feature of our model is that borrowers may decide not to apply for income-based payments due to
non-monetary veriﬁcation/application costs. As emphasized in Government Accountability Of
ﬁce (2015), these costs not only reﬂect potential stigma eﬀects but also the burdens of regularly
reporting earnings and any changes in family structure.
The model implies that the presence of these costs will induce some eligible borrowers to forego
repayment assistance if they have suﬃcient parental support, generating a negative relationship
between parental transfers and repayment assistance take-up. By contrast, monetary veriﬁcation
costs and problems associated with moral hazard predict no relationship or even a positive re
lationship between parental support and application for repayment assistance. Thus, the model
is not only a useful framework for understanding the relationship between parental support and
student loan repayment, but it also provides testable predictions that shed light on underlying
market frictions central to the design of eﬃcient student loan programs (i.e. veriﬁcation costs
and moral hazard).
Our model highlights the importance of knowing whether there exists a strong connection
between student loan repayment and parental transfers (or other available ﬁnancial resources other
than the borrower’s own earnings).2 Perhaps surprisingly, there is little or no current empirical
evidence about this relationship, likely due to a lack of data on these resources. While some
data sets (e.g. Baccalaureate and Beyond, Beginning Postsecondary Students) contain limited
information about parental income when borrowers attended college (usually from ﬁnancial aid
applications), this information may not serve as an eﬀective proxy for post-school access to
parental transfers (or other resources like personal savings). Parental transfers capture not only
diﬀerences in parents’ ability to help their children, which would tend to be reﬂected in parental
income, but also diﬀerences in parents’ willingness to help, which need not be.3
2

While we do not explicitly model access to other resources like personal savings in our theoretical analysis,
they would play a similar role to parental transfers.
3
Park (2016) documents considerable heterogeneity in parental support for higher education conditional on
parental income.
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We address this data limitation by combining administrative data on student loan amounts
and repayment outcomes from the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) with data from a
new survey that we helped design to measure a broad array of available resources, including
personal savings and unique information about potential parental support.4 These data reveal a
strong relationship between student loan repayment and all types of ﬁnancial resources available
to borrowers. While repayment problems are primarily concentrated among borrowers with low
post-school earnings, we ﬁnd that many low-earning borrowers still manage to make their standard
loan payments by taking advantage of access to parental assistance and personal savings.5 For
example, only 4% of low-earning borrowers with access to (at least) a modest amount of parental
assistance and savings experience a situation where they fail to make their standard payments
(i.e. receive repayment assistance or experience delinquency/default), while 60% of low-earning
borrowers with access to little parental support and negligible savings fail to make their standard
payments. Taking into account other factors that could be correlated with parental support
and savings does not change this basic result. Thus, our ﬁndings demonstrate that (Canadian)
student borrowers with the resources to pay their loans almost always do and that resources other
than own earnings play a critical insurance role for many borrowers who experience adverse labor
market outcomes. Further highlighting the importance of our new resource measures, we ﬁnd
that the value of parental income for predicting repayment is quite modest.
Since nearly half of CSLP borrowers who are eligible for repayment assistance (due to low
earnings) do not apply for reduced payments, it is not surprising that student loan administrators
have raised concerns about a lack of student awareness of repayment options.6 However, it is
diﬃcult to reconcile a general lack of borrower awareness with the signiﬁcantly lower repayment
assistance take-up rates among eligible borrowers with greater parental support and savings.
When viewed through the lens of our model, these results suggest an alternative explanation: that
non-monetary veriﬁcation costs discourage application for repayment assistance among eligible
borrowers with access to ﬁnancial resources beyond their own earnings.7
Motivated by concerns about low take-up rates for repayment assistance among eligible bor
rowers, the CSLP has introduced several initiatives to reduce application/veriﬁcation costs (e.g.
introduction of online enrolment). Reducing these costs is also a central feature of U.S. proposals
4
The CSLP services all provinces and territories in Canada except Quebec. In 2011-12, the CSLP provided
loans to 447,000 full-time students (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2016).
5
Several previous American and Canadian studies document higher rates of non-payment among low-earners
(Dynarski, 1994; Flint, 1997; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2015; Schwartz and Finnie, 2002). See Gross et al.
(2009) for a recent survey.
6
Similar concerns have also been raised in the U.S., where the Treasury Department estimated that only 20% of
all Direct Loan borrowers eligible for income-based repayment plans in 2012 were actually enrolled (Government
Accountability Oﬃce, 2015).
7
Of course, most borrowers may be initially uninformed about their repayment options, choosing to become
informed about repayment assistance only when necessary. Our results are consistent with this possibility, where
acquiring the information is simply part of the cost of applying – a cost borrowers with greater parental support
are less willing to pay.
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aimed at facilitating enrolment in income-based repayment plans (Government Accountability
Oﬃce, 2016). Our theoretical framework raises important concerns about these eﬀorts, since
they could result in sizeable repayment reductions by borrowers with low post-school earnings
but suﬃcient parental support (or savings), who often choose to repay their loans in full despite
their eligibility for reduced payments. To the extent that interest rates would need to be raised to
cover the losses associated with these payment reductions, reducing application/veriﬁcation costs
would generate an ex ante transfer from students with little parental support to those with greater
support. Eliminating veriﬁcation costs may not only have undesirable redistribution eﬀects, but
we demonstrate that it could also be economically ineﬃcient given the current structure of stu
dent loan programs. With the focus of current repayment assistance on the borrower’s earnings
alone, the existence of modest veriﬁcation costs may be an eﬃcient way to target that assistance
to borrowers who need it most.
To study the empirical relevance of these concerns, we simulate the eﬀects of moving from
the current CSLP environment, in which income-based payments are oﬀered as an option to lowearning borrowers under RAP, to a policy which automatically enrolls all borrowers in RAP. On
one hand, this policy change could raise revenues by encouraging currently delinquent/defaulting
borrowers with low earnings to make reduced income-based payments. However, these gains are
likely to be quite small, since most borrowers in delinquency/default have low earnings, and
would, therefore, be expected to make low (or zero) RAP payments. On the other hand, the
policy change would generate revenue losses from low-earning borrowers who currently make the
standard payment even though they are eligible for reduced payments. Our ﬁnding that many lowearning borrowers have access to other resources and make standard payments suggests that these
revenue losses would be substantial. Considering the balance of these two eﬀects, our calculations
suggest that making RAP enrollment automatic would lead to sizeable revenue losses for CSLP,
at least in the short-run.
Given the drawbacks of simply reducing non-monetary veriﬁcation costs under the current
system, it is natural to consider more general changes that better account for the important
role of parental transfers. Speciﬁcally, we consider the design of a (constrained) eﬃcient student
loan program that aims to provide liquidity for school and insurance against post-school earnings
risk, subject to concerns about moral hazard and non-monetary costs of income veriﬁcation. We
show that eﬃcient student loan contracts would have similar features to current government stu
dent loan programs in Canada and the U.S., in that borrowers with high earnings would make a
standard ﬁxed payment, while those with low earnings would have their earnings veriﬁed and re
ceive reduced income-based payments. The primary distinction is that, under eﬃcient contracts,
implicit interest rates for the standard payment, income-based payment amounts, and the eligi
bility threshold (for reduced payment) would all be borrower-speciﬁc, depending on the amount
borrowed, (reported) parental support, and earnings potential. Unlike current loan contracts, ef
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ﬁcient contracts would compensate borrowers for non-monetary veriﬁcation costs associated with
applying for reduced income-based payments. With eﬃcient loan contracts designed to maximize
the amount of insurance that can be provided given market frictions, it would be optimal to re
duce veriﬁcation costs as much as possible. When these contracts are structured to be actuarially
fair (i.e. zero expected returns) for each borrower, there would be no ex ante redistribution across
borrowers with diﬀerent parental support or earnings potential. In some cases, eﬃciency and
actuarial fairness at the borrower level can eliminate incentives for students applying for loans to
misrepresent the level of parental support they expect to receive after school. This would not be
the case if an attempt were made to simply tie repayment amounts to borrower-reported parental
transfers under current programs.

2

Student Loan Contracts with Parental Transfers, Costly
Income Veriﬁcation and Moral Hazard

In this section, we develop a model of student borrowing and repayment when post-school earnings
depend on (unobserved) eﬀort and are uncertain. We consider current government student loan
programs, which oﬀer borrowers the option of repaying their loans in full or, if eligible, applying
for reduced income-based payments.8 Crucially, payment reductions are independent of parental
transfers, and eligible borrowers may decide not to apply for income-based payments due to nonmonetary veriﬁcation/application costs. We use the model to examine how parental transfers
impact student loan repayment, as well as other choices. Insights from this analysis motivate a
new test for the presence of non-monetary veriﬁcation costs.

2.1

Environment

We assume that individuals live for two periods. During college (period 1), they make tuition
payments costing T ≥ 0, consume c1 , and borrow d – all coming from their initial resources w ≥ 0,
which includes any early parental support. After college (period 2), they consume c2 out of their
earnings y and post-school transfers from parents τ ≥ 0 less loan repayments D. While we refer
to τ as parental transfers, it may also reﬂect other ﬁnancial resources available to borrowers but
not considered by student loan programs in setting income-based payments.9
Post-school earnings y ≥ y ≡ min{y} are uncertain and depend on costly (unobserved) eﬀort
e ≥ 0, which may reﬂect such activities as studying during college or post-school job search. We
assume a well-behaved conditional density function Φ(y|e) and φ(y|e) ≡ ∂Φ(y|e)/∂y ∈ (0, ∞)
for all (e, y) ∈ [0, ∞) × [y, ∞). We also assume that earnings under higher eﬀort ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominate (FOSD) earnings under low eﬀort, so ∂Φ(∂ey|e) < 0 for all (e, y).
8

For simplicity, we abstract from the option of default; however, we introduce this possibility in Section 2.2.6.
To simplify the exposition, most of our analysis assumes that post-school parental transfers are exogenous and
anticipated in period 1. We consider the role of endogenous transfers from altruistic parents in Subsection 2.2.7.
9
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Preferences for consumption each period are given by the strictly increasing and strictly con
cave function u(c), while eﬀort has a utility cost v(e) that is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
Individuals discount the future at rate β > 0.
With uncertainty in post-school earnings, borrowers maximize expected lifetime utility, eval
uating consumption and eﬀort allocations according to:
⎡
⎤
�∞
⎢
⎥
U = u (c1 ) + β ⎣ u (c2 (y)) φ(y|e)dy − v(e)⎦ ,

(1)

y

where consumption is given by c1 = w − T + d during school and c2 = y + τ − D after school.

2.2

A Basic Government Student Loan Program

Consider a government student loan program that requires payments with a ﬁxed gross interest
rate of R > 1 when earnings are high, but oﬀers reduced earnings-contingent payments ξ(y) ≥ 0
for those who verify that their earnings are below the eligibility threshold θ. These payments ξ(y)
may reﬂect actual collections by the government lender as well as any ﬁnancial costs of earnings
veriﬁcation imposed on borrowers. Consistent with many government loan programs (including
the CSLP), we assume that these payments are non-decreasing in earnings with 0 ≤ ξ e (y) < 1
for all y.10 For expositional purposes, we assume that repayments are zero at the lowest earnings
level: ξ(y) = 0.11 Altogether, loan repayments are given by
D(d, y) =

ξ(y) if y < θ is veriﬁed
Rd otherwise.

(2)

Importantly, borrowers with y < θ who wish to have their earnings veriﬁed in order to reduce
their payment must also incur a non-monetary veriﬁcation cost of ψ ≥ 0, which is directly sub
tracted from expected utility, U , as deﬁned in equation (1). A key distinction between monetary
veriﬁcation costs, incorporated in ξ(y), and non-monetary veriﬁcation costs, ψ, is that the former
directly lower the marginal utility of consumption while the latter do not. We pay particular
attention to non-monetary veriﬁcation costs below, since they have important implications for
the role of parental transfers in repayment decisions.
10

Eligibility for reduced payments is also typically limited to borrowers whose income-based payment amount
does not exceed the debt-based standard payment amount. With non-negative monetary costs of veriﬁca
tion/enrolment, this constraint would never bind and has no aﬀect on behavior.
11
This is typically the case for actual income-contingent payments; however, it need not be true when ξ(·)
includes monetary veriﬁcation costs. This assumption ensures that borrowers with very low earnings would always
prefer the income-contingent payment to the standard payment in the absence of any veriﬁcation costs. Otherwise,
there may be some borrowers with very low loan amounts such that Rd < ξ(y), in which case they would always
choose the standard repayment. We eﬀectively ignore this case, implicitly assuming that ﬁnancial veriﬁcation
costs are small relative to loan amounts.
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We assume throughout that initial wealth w is suﬃciently low that students wish to borrow,
so d > 0. Government student loans may be restricted by an upper loan limit:
d ≤ dmax .
2.2.1

(3)

Repayment Decisions

Borrowers must make a standard repayment Rd if earnings are suﬃciently high (i.e. y ≥ θ), in
which case post-school consumption is given by
cS2 (y, d; τ ) ≡ y + τ − Rd.
For y < θ, borrowers may prefer to have their earnings veriﬁed to qualify for the incomecontingent payment, yielding post-school consumption
cI2 (y; τ ) ≡ y + τ − ξ(y).
It is optimal to incur the veriﬁcation costs for reduced income-based payments if and only if the
gains exceed the costs:
G(y, d; τ ) ≡ u(y + τ − ξ(y)) − u(y + τ − Rd) > ψ.

(4)

Those with low enough earnings are eligible for the income-contingent payment, but they may
prefer making the standard payment if the income-based payment or the veriﬁcation costs are
suﬃciently high. With ψ > 0, borrowers would never choose the income-contingent payment
unless it entailed a payment reduction (i.e. ξ(y) < Rd), which would need to be large enough to
oﬀset the veriﬁcation costs.
The gains from applying for income-based payments, G(y, d; τ ), are strictly increasing in debt
d, because the income-based payment does not depend on debt while the standard payment does.
Furthermore, if the gains are non-negative, then (by concavity of u(·)) they are decreasing in
both earnings and parental transfers.12 The assumptions that ξ(y) = 0 and d > 0 imply that
G(y, d; τ ) > 0, so the gains from applying for income-contingent repayments are positive and
decreasing in earnings at the very low end. As earnings rise, the gains may turn negative if ξ(y)
becomes suﬃciently high.
Conditional on debt and realized earnings, eﬀort does not aﬀect repayment behavior. For
ψ > 0, there are three potential repayment cases to consider for borrowers eligible for incomecontingent payments:
Case 1: If G(y, d; τ ) ≤ ψ, then the gains from income-contingent repayment do not exceed
the veriﬁcation costs even when earnings are at their lowest. Borrowers with suﬃciently low debt
12

See Appendix E.1 for these derivatives and other technical details.
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or high parental transfers (for whom this condition applies) would always make the standard loan
payment regardless of their own earnings.
Case 2: If G(θ, d; τ ) ≥ ψ, then the gains of income-contingent repayment are at least as
high as the veriﬁcation costs even when earnings are at the eligibility threshold. Borrowers
with suﬃciently high levels of debt (for whom this condition holds) would choose to have their
earnings veriﬁed in order to pay the lower income-based amount, for any level of earnings that
makes them eligible for reduced payments. Borrowers with very little parental support are also
likely to behave in this way; however, it is possible that G(θ, d; 0) < ψ if debt is low enough or
the eligibility threshold is high enough.
Case 3: If G(θ, d; τ ) < ψ < G(y, d; τ ), then there will be a threshold level of earnings
ŷ(d; τ, ψ) ∈ (y, θ), above which borrowers will repay the standard amount and below which they
will have their earnings veriﬁed in order to pay the lower income-based amount. This threshold
solves
u [ŷ(d; τ, ψ) + τ − ξ (ŷ(d; τ, ψ))] − u [ŷ(d; τ, ψ) + τ − Rd] = ψ.

(5)

Using the implicit function theorem, one can show that ŷ is decreasing in τ but increasing in
d. This case is relevant for borrowers with moderate levels of debt and parental transfers. The
probability of applying for a reduced income-based payment given student debt d, transfers τ ,
and eﬀort e is Φ(ŷ(d; τ, ψ)|e), which is decreasing in parental transfers but increasing in debt.
Summarizing these results, borrowers will choose to have their income veriﬁed to receive a
reduced income-based payment if and only if
y < ỹ(d; τ, θ) ≡ max{y, min{ŷ(d; τ ), θ}},

(6)

where conditioning on ψ is implicit. This veriﬁcation threshold does not depend on eﬀort and
depends on debt and parental transfers only in intermediate ranges between y and θ.13 The prob
ability of applying for a reduced income-based payment conditional on (d, e; τ, θ) is Φ(ỹ(d; τ, θ)|e).
2.2.2

Borrowing and Eﬀort Choices

Students choose borrowing d and eﬀort e to maximize expected utility U (equation 1) less nonmonetary costs ψ in the case of veriﬁcation subject to the borrowing constraint (equation 3)
and repayment decision rule given by equation (6). As shown in Appendix E.1, the ﬁrst order
condition (FOC) for student debt d can be written as
y|e))E[ue (c2 )|y ≥ y,
˜ e] + λ,
ue (c1 ) = Rβ(1 − Φ(˜

(7)

where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on (3). If borrowing is unconstrained, then λ = 0 and
ue (c1 ) ≤ RβE[ue (c2 )|e], so the expected marginal utility of consumption increases after school
13

Here, ŷ(d; τ ) reﬂects the solution to equation (5) for any value of y. Notice that ỹ = y if and only if
G(y, d; τ ) ≤ ψ, and ỹ = θ if and only if G(θ, d; τ ) ≥ ψ. As discussed below, ŷ does not depend on τ when ψ = 0.
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when Rβ = 1. That is, the potential for partial loan forgiveness associated with income-contingent
repayments generates a tendency for “over-borrowing”.14
Optimal eﬀort must satisfy the following interior FOC:
v e (e) =

∂Φ(ỹ|e)
∂E [u(c2 (y))|e]
−ψ
,
∂e
∂e

(8)

equating the direct marginal utility costs of eﬀort with the marginal gains from higher post-school
earnings/consumption and reductions in expected veriﬁcation costs.
2.2.3

Eﬀects of Parental Transfers on Behavior

In this section, we use our model to study the eﬀects of parental transfers τ on borrower behavior.15
We begin by discussing the eﬀects of parental transfers on eﬀort. Because income-based
payments implicitly ‘tax’ earnings while standard payments do not, the eﬀects of transfers on
eﬀort will depend, in part, on how the veriﬁcation threshold adjusts. As discussed above, if
non-monetary veriﬁcation costs are suﬃciently high (ψ > G(y, d; τ )) or suﬃciently low (ψ <
G(θ, d; τ )), the veriﬁcation threshold is set at y or θ, respectively, and is unaﬀected by (marginal)
changes in parental transfers or student debt. In these cases, parental transfers only impact
eﬀort through an income eﬀect. With high veriﬁcation costs, borrowers always repay in full, so
consumption is monotonically increasing in earnings and eﬀort. As a result, the income eﬀect of
eﬀort is unambiguously negative: parental transfers reduce the marginal value of income, which
reduces incentives to exert eﬀort. When veriﬁcation costs are low, consumption discontinuously
drops when earnings rise above the eligibility threshold (as borrowers switch from income-based
to standard payments). As a result, an increase in eﬀort could lead to a reduction in consumption
for a range of earnings realizations. As long as eﬀort still lowers the expected marginal utility of
post-school consumption, the income eﬀect will continue to be negative, and parental transfers
will reduce eﬀort.16 Letting d∗ , e∗ , and c∗2 reﬂect optimal borrowing, eﬀort, and post-school
consumption, we summarize these results in the following lemma. (Proofs for all results can be
found in Appendix E.)
Lemma 1 If (i) ψ > G(y, d∗ ; τ ) or (ii) ψ < G(θ, d∗ ; τ ) and ∂E[ue (c∗2 )|e∗ ]/∂e < 0, then
0 and

de∗
dτ

∂ y˜
∂d

=

∂ỹ
∂τ

=

< 0.

14

When preferences are neutral with respect intertemporal consumption allocations in terms of time discounting
(i.e. Rβ = 1) and prudence (i.e. u""" (·) = 0), expected consumption falls after school in the absence of borrowing
constraints. Stringent limits on borrowing (or suﬃcient patience or prudence) can more than oﬀset this force,
yielding increasing average consumption proﬁles.
15
Note that unanticipated transfers would have no eﬀect on borrowing or eﬀort choices. They would only aﬀect
repayment behavior through direct eﬀects of transfers on the veriﬁcation threshold (i.e. ∂ ỹ/∂τ ).
16
Appendix E.1 shows that if the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) is satisﬁed for Φ(y|e) and the
eligibility threshold θ is not too near the point where eﬀort goes from reducing to increasing the likelihood of
earnings (i.e. where ∂φ(y|e)/∂e = 0), then the expected marginal utility of post-school consumption is declining
in eﬀort.
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When veriﬁcation costs are moderate (G(θ, d∗ ; τ ) < ψ < G(y, d∗ ; τ )), borrowers will lower
their veriﬁcation threshold in response to an increase in parental transfers. Because this reduces
the likelihood that borrowers apply for income-based payments, which implicitly ‘tax’ earnings,
it encourages eﬀort. If this eﬀect dominates the opposing income eﬀect, eﬀort will be increasing
in parental transfers.
Next, consider the eﬀects of parental transfers on borrowing. On one hand, the availability
of additional post-school resources encourages borrowing, as students wish to shift some of those
resources to the schooling period. On the other hand, reductions in the veriﬁcation threshold
(and potentially eﬀort) discourage borrowing. Unfortunately, it is not easy to determine which
force will dominate, so the total eﬀects of transfers on borrowing are generally ambiguous.
Finally, consider the eﬀects of parental transfers on the probability of making a reduced
income-based payment:
�
�
dΦ(ỹ(d, τ )|e)
∂Φ(ỹ|e) de
∂ỹ ∂d ∂ỹ
=
+ φ(ỹ|e)
+
.
(9)
dτ
∂e dτ
∂d ∂τ
∂τ
eﬀort eﬀect

threshold eﬀect

The ﬁrst term reﬂects the fact that, by inﬂuencing eﬀort, parental transfers will change the
likelihood that a borrower’s earnings are below a particular veriﬁcation threshold ỹ, while the
second term reﬂects the fact that parental transfers will lead to an adjustment in the veriﬁcation
threshold itself.
When ψ > G(y, d∗ ; τ ), borrowers always repay in full, so both the ‘eﬀort’ and ‘threshold’
eﬀects are zero and marginal changes in parental transfers do not aﬀect repayment behavior.
There are also no ‘threshold’ eﬀects when ψ < G(θ, d∗ ; τ ). However, the ‘eﬀort’ eﬀect is positive
(assuming eﬀort reduces the expected marginal utility of post-school consumption), since eﬀort is
strictly decreasing in transfers (Lemma 1) and Φ(y|e) is strictly decreasing in e (due to FOSD).
In this case, the probability of making a reduced loan payment is strictly increasing in parental
transfers. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If ψ > G(y, d∗ ; τ ), then the probability of making a reduced loan payment is zero
and unaﬀected by a marginal change in parental transfers. If ψ < G(θ, d∗ ; τ ) and ∂E[ue (c∗2 )|e∗ ]/∂e <
0, then the probability of making a reduced loan payment is strictly increasing in parental transfers.
With moderate non-monetary veriﬁcation costs satisfying G(θ, d∗ ; τ ) < ψ < G(y, d∗ ; τ ),
parental transfers may raise or lower the likelihood of making reduced payments, since borrowers
will adjust the veriﬁcation threshold and the ‘eﬀort’ eﬀect is ambiguous. If additional parental
transfers lead to large increases in the veriﬁcation threshold, then eﬀort may increase and the
probability of making a reduced income-based payment may fall.
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2.2.4

A Test for the Presence of Non-Monetary Veriﬁcation Costs

The previous subsection shows that non-monetary veriﬁcation costs aﬀect the relationship be
tween parental transfers and student loan repayment. Based on this, we now develop a test for
the presence of non-monetary veriﬁcation costs.
When ψ = 0, the repayment decision (for those eligible for reduced payments) depends only
on a comparison of ξ(y) and Rd, so the veriﬁcation threshold does not directly depend on parental
transfers. This means that the probability of making reduced payments conditional on debt de
pends only on the eﬀect of transfers on eﬀort (and, therefore, the distribution of earnings). With
population heterogeneity in initial wealth w and parental transfers τ , borrowers anticipating dif
ferent transfer amounts may still borrow the same amount (due to diﬀerences in initial wealth).17
The following proposition shows that among borrowers with the same debt, those receiving higher
parental transfers will put forth less eﬀort (due to the income eﬀects discussed earlier) and will
be more likely to make reduced loan payments.18
Proposition 3 Suppose ψ = 0. If ∂E[ue (c2∗ )|e∗ ]/∂e < 0 for all (e∗ , c2∗ ), then among borrowers
with the same level of debt, those with higher levels of parental transfers exert less eﬀort and have
a greater probability of making reduced income-based payments.
Appendix E.2 shows that when ψ = 0, the condition ∂E[ue (c2 )|e∗ ]/∂e < 0 is satisﬁed for all
borrowers with low levels of debt d∗ ≤ R−1 ξ(θ). It is also satisﬁed for borrowers with higher
levels of debt under fairly general conditions.19 Important for our purposes, it is always satisﬁed
when there is no arbitrary eligibility limit on earnings alone. This is consistent with current U.S.
and Canadian student loan programs, which generally allow borrowers for whom the income-based
payment is lower than the standard debt-based payment to apply for reduced payments.
Proposition 3 implies an empirically testable prediction for the presence of non-monetary
veriﬁcation costs based on our cross-sectional data from Canada: basic logic dictates that if
borrowers with higher levels of parental transfers (but the same debt) do not have a greater
probability of making reduced income-based payments, then non-monetary veriﬁcation costs ψ
must not be zero.20 This test is easy to implement, since it only depends on the cross-sectional
relationship between parental transfers and repayment choices.
One potential concern is that our test would be uninformative if borrowers with higher trans
fers always had a greater probability of applying for reduced payments, even when ψ > 0. For
tunately, this is not the case. In the presence of non-monetary veriﬁcation costs, the veriﬁcation
17

This implicitly assumes that all individuals have the same earnings potential, or ability. Alternatively, these
results would apply conditional on ability. Unobserved diﬀerences in ability are discussed in Subsection 2.2.5.
18
Note that this proposition considers a comparison across borrowers with diﬀerent levels of parental transfers
who chose to borrow the same amount, while Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 report standard comparative statics
results holding initial wealth constant.
19
See footnote 16 or Appendix E.
20
The reverse need not be true: if borrowers with higher transfers have a greater probability of making reduced
payments, ψ need not be zero.
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threshold will be lower for those with higher parental transfers. This can easily oﬀset any in
centives of higher parental transfers to reduce eﬀort, resulting in a negative relationship between
parental transfers and income-based payments. Our empirical results in Section 4 suggest that
this is, indeed, the case in our context and that non-monetary veriﬁcation costs must be positive.
2.2.5

Heterogeneity in Ability

The distribution of earnings may diﬀer across individuals due to factors other than eﬀort. Thus
far, we have abstracted from such diﬀerences, or implicitly assumed that these factors (e.g. abil
ity) can be observed and conditioned upon. Fortunately, it is straightforward to generalize our
‘test’ for ψ = 0 to account for unobserved heterogeneity in ability by simply conditioning on
post-school earnings as well as debt when examining the relationship between parental transfers
and repayment behavior. To see why, notice that when ψ = 0, repayment choices should be
independent of parental transfers conditional on both debt and post-school earnings, since the
repayment decision depends only on a comparison of ξ(y) and Rd (among the eligible). When
ψ > 0, the probability that someone applies for reduced payments should be weakly decreasing
in transfers (conditional on both debt and earnings), since the veriﬁcation threshold is weakly
decreasing in transfers.21 This is what we observe in our data.
2.2.6

Incorporating Default

Suppose individuals also have the option to stop paying their loans altogether (i.e. default),
which entails monetary costs ξD (y) ≥ 0 and non-monetary costs ψD ≥ 0, where we assume
e
(y) < 1. Monetary costs may reﬂect legal or collection fees, wage garnishments, etc., while
0 ≤ ξD
non-monetary costs may reﬂect stigma or other costs associated with a poor credit record (e.g.
diﬃculty renting an apartment or obtaining a credit card). In this case, borrowers choose between
repaying in full, applying for a reduced income-based payment, and default.
When the non-monetary costs associated with both income-based payments and default are
similar, the choice between them simpliﬁes to the lesser of ξ(y) and ξD (y). There may be some
earnings levels for which default is preferred and others for which the income-based payment
is preferred.22 As discussed further in Appendix E.3, the choice between making the standard
(full) repayment vs. making a reduced payment (i.e. default or reduced income-based payment) is
quite similar to the problem without default, replacing ξ(y) with the preferred reduced payment,
21

In the absence of measurement error, the probability of applying for a repayment reduction is one for earnings
below ỹ and zero above, where ỹ is independent of τ when ψ = 0 and weakly decreasing in τ when ψ > 0. With
classical measurement error in earnings (i.e. error independent of true earnings and debt), the probability of a
repayment reduction conditional on debt and measured earnings will typically be between 0 and 1, but it will
continue to be independent of τ when ψ = 0 and weakly decreasing in τ when ψ > 0.
22
Instead, assuming ξ(y) = ξD (y) and ψ = ψD , individuals would always prefer the option with the lesser
non-monetary cost. This yields the same reduced payment decision (default or income-based payments) for all
earnings outcomes.
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min{ξ(y), ξD (y)}. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the costs of default, eﬀort continues
to be declining in parental transfers when non-monetary costs are high or low. Furthermore,
among borrowers with the same debt, those with greater parental transfers should be more likely
to make a reduced payment (either default or income-based payments) in the absence of nonmonetary costs of veriﬁcation and default. Even with positive non-monetary costs of default (i.e.
ψD > ψ = 0), reduced payments should be more common among those with greater parental
transfers as long as non-monetary default costs are not too high and default is only preferred at
the lowest earnings levels.23 (Appendix Table A1 shows that delinquency and default are rare
when annual earnings exceed $20,000.) Altogether, our evidence in Section 4 that the failure to
make standard loan payments (due to default or income-based payments) is strongly declining in
parental transfers suggests that non-monetary veriﬁcation costs ψ are important.
2.2.7

Altruistic Parents and Endogenous Transfers

Parental transfers are likely to be endogenous to their children’s earnings. Appendix E.4 shows
that when parents are altruistic towards their children, all previous qualitative results with re
spect to parental transfers apply directly to parental income. Furthermore, parental transfers
are declining in own earnings and increasing in both parental income and altruism. Because
transfers are increasing in parental income for any given level of altruism, qualitative results with
respect to exogenous parental transfers continue to apply even when the transfers are endogenous.
Furthermore, when parental wealth and altruism vary across families, parental transfers and ac
cess to parental support (deﬁned as the value of transfers when own earnings equal y) reﬂect a
combination of both the means and willingness of parents to provide support.

3

Data

In order to understand the relationship between the ﬁnancial resources available to borrowers and
their repayment decisions, we exploit both survey data and administrative data from the CSLP.
The CSLP’s Client Satisfaction Survey (CSS) is an annual telephone survey of roughly 2,700
borrowers of all ages (in-study and in-repayment).24 This survey is traditionally used to gauge
borrowers’ general satisfaction with the CSLP program. However, for the years 2011 and 2012,
we were given the opportunity to add new questions to the survey in an eﬀort to understand why
some people experience repayment problems for their student loan obligations while others do
23

Alternatively, if ψD is so high that nobody ever wants to default, then Propositions 2 and 3 apply directly.
Survey response rates were 50% and 52%, respectively, in 2011 and 2012. The survey administrator conducted
an analysis of non-response to see whether responders and non-responders diﬀered in the following dimensions
relevant to our analysis: loan amount, repayment status (current, in arrears, on Interest Relief), institution type
(private vs. public), province, and age. Nearly all of these diﬀerences were statistically insigniﬁcant at the 5% level
in both survey years; however, responders were 3-4 percentage points less likely to be in arrears in both surveys,
suggesting that students having repayment problems are slightly under-represented.
24
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not. Most importantly, this opportunity enabled us to collect unique information about ﬁnancial
resources – not only borrowers’ post-school earnings, but also their access to parental support
and savings – in addition to standard background characteristics (e.g., gender, indigenous sta
tus, province of residence, educational attainment) and a novel measure informative about the
perceived consequences of not repaying student loans. We merge data from the CSS with ad
ministrative records from the CSLP, which provide information on borrowers’ loan balances and
repayment outcomes (i.e., loan status) throughout the entire time they were clients. Adminis
trative records also contain information about dependency status and parental income levels (for
dependent students) at the time of student aid application.
CSLP borrowers are not required to begin making payments on their loans until six months
after leaving school. After this grace period, all CSLP loans are consolidated and repayment
begins. While most borrowers enter loan repayment after a single period of schooling, some leave
and return to school and may have multiple distinct repayment periods. We focus on repayment
outcomes during the last repayment period observed in our data (as of two months after the
CSS). Since repayment begins six months after borrowers leave school, our sample respondents
have been out of school for at least eight consecutive months. To mitigate CSS sampling concerns
associated with borrowers who have been out of school for many years, we limit our sample to
borrowers who entered their most recent loan repayment period no more than two years prior
to answering the CSS.25 Thus, we analyze repayment behavior during the ﬁrst two years after
repayment begins. These borrowers are of particular interest, because most repayment problems
surface relatively quickly. For example, 27% of recent CSLP borrowers entered RAP during their
ﬁrst two years of repayment, compared to only 1.5% ﬁrst entering RAP over the next two years
(Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary, 2014). Finally, we restrict our sample to borrowers under age 30 to
ensure a more homogeneous group of respondents.
For comparability across analyses, we restrict our sample throughout the paper to the 689
borrowers who had administrative loan records, non-missing responses to our main ﬁnancial
resource variables of interest, and other ‘baseline’ variables likely to inﬂuence repayment. Sample
weights are used for all calculations to account for stratiﬁed sampling by province, loan type, and
repayment status (within the CSS sampling frame).
Based on our administrative records, CSLP borrowers in our sample owed nearly $14,000 on
their student loans, on average, at the beginning of the repayment period. To study repayment,
we create an indicator for whether an individual has a repayment problem related to her student
25

Unfortunately, the CSS does not survey borrowers who had fully repaid their loans nor those who were already
in default (those in delinquency were surveyed). As discussed in Appendix B, our sample of respondents in the
ﬁrst two years of repayment excludes less than 5% of the population who was already in default and about
10% who had already fully repaid their loans. These exclusions primarily reﬂect individuals who never made a
payment or repaid immediately. Restricting the sample to respondents in the ﬁrst year of repayment eliminates
concerns about exclusion due to early default and reduces any sample selection due to early repayment in full.
This restricted sample, while much smaller, yields very similar results to those presented in the paper (e.g., see
Appendix Table B1).
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debt at the time of the CSS.26 This variable takes a value of one if the administrative data
indicates that a borrower is delinquent or in default on her loan or if she is receiving incomebased repayment assistance through RAP.27 Overall, 26% of borrowers experienced a repayment
problem based on this deﬁnition.
Our comprehensive measure of repayment problems is consistent with our conceptual frame
work, which emphasizes the choice between making the standard debt-based loan payment vs.
a reduced income-based amount with additional non-monetary costs. Borrowers in delinquency
or default (eﬀectively an extended period of delinquency) are often subjected to wage garnish
ments, income tax oﬀsets, and other ﬁnancial penalties that are generally low but increasing
in their earnings, much like income-based payments associated with RAP. Furthermore, delin
quency/default may carry stigma or other non-monetary penalties (e.g. contact with collection
agencies, diﬃculties in renting due to a poor credit rating) analogous to the non-monetary ver
iﬁcation or application costs of repayment assistance. As discussed in Section 2.2.6, borrowers
will compare their utility under standard payment against the better of repayment assistance
and delinquency/default. Our comprehensive measure also avoids the diﬃculty of making subjec
tive judgments about which repayment problems are most similar or deserve greater attention.28
While this is our preferred measure of repayment problems, Appendix A repeats the paper’s
primary empirical analysis using an indicator that includes only delinquency and default (experi
enced by 10% of our sample). The general conclusions associated with this outcome are the same
as those reported for our more comprehensive (and preferred) measure.
As discussed earlier, a borrower’s own earnings is the only ﬁnancial resource taken into account
by CSLP when determining his/her ability to repay student debt. Figure 1 (panel A) shows the
distribution of current earnings in all available categories recorded by the CSS. Nearly half of our
sample of recent school-leavers earned less than $20,000 annually, and about 85% earned less than
$40,000. These low earnings levels suggest that many borrowers would have diﬃculty repaying
their student loans if this were the only source of funds available to them.
26

The 2011 and 2012 CSS surveys took place in January and February of both years. We examine repayment
status as of February 2011 and 2012.
27
RAP reduces CSLP loan payments for eligible borrowers to ‘aﬀordable’ amounts no greater than 20% of gross
family income. We discuss RAP further in Section 5 and Appendix D. In a few cases, respondents received very
similar repayment assistance delivered through earlier programs referred to as Interest Relief (IR) and Debt Re
duction in Repayment (DRR). We observe a very small number of defaults in our sample, since the sampling frame
(which generally excluded borrowers in default) was determined a couple months before the CSS was administered.
Our repayment problem indicator also includes less common non-payment statuses like claim submitted, consumer
proposal, and return-to-government.
28
Although borrowers on formal repayment assistance are generally considered by the CSLP to be in good
standing, these programs are also costly even when borrowers do not ultimately default, since interest payments
are often covered by CSLP and loan amounts may be forgiven. In 2010-11, nearly 90% of RAP recipients made no
monthly payments, so CSLP covered associated interest payments at an estimated cost of $83 million; another $36
million was budgeted to cover future unpaid principal amounts associated with the RAP program for CSLP loans
disbursed in 2010-11 (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2012). As noted in the introduction,
evidence from the U.S. suggests that borrowers entering default vs. income-based payments are expected to repay
a similar share of their remaining debt over the rest of their lives.
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This paper is motivated by the possibility that other ﬁnancial resources may also play a
crucial role in repayment. Panels B and C of Figure 1 report the distributions for expected
parental transfers and own savings, respectively, for all the categories used by the CSS. When
asked how much parents or other family would be willing to give them if they needed money over
the next six months, 30% reported that they could obtain at least $2,500.29 Roughly half of the
borrowers in our sample report at least $1,000 in savings. Combining these additional sources of
support, we ﬁnd that 63% of respondents have access to at least $2,500 in parental transfers or
$1,000 in savings, while only 19% have access to both.
Since other data sources do not contain direct measures of student borrowers’ parental support
and savings, previous studies have sometimes considered the roles of dependency status and
parental income at the time students applied for aid (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2015). About
40% of our sample attended school as a dependent student. Among these students, average annual
parental income was about $46,000 with 30% having income below $25,000.
Descriptive statistics for other variables used in our analysis, referred to as ‘baseline deter
minants’, are reported in Table 1. In terms of background characteristics, our sample contains
more women than men, has an average age of twenty-four, and contains 8.3% indigenous persons.
Roughly 40% of borrowers had earned at least a university degree (from four-year institutions),
with only 14% of our sample having attended a private for-proﬁt institution (typically a voca
tional/technical school). The CSS contains a unique survey question eliciting beliefs about the
importance of repaying student loans. Speciﬁcally, the survey asks borrowers which type of loan
(e.g. CSLP, credit cards, home mortgage) they would repay ﬁrst if ﬁnancial diﬃculties prevented
them from paying them all. Table 1 shows that roughly 40% of all respondents report that they
would stop paying their CSLP loans ﬁrst.30
29

Speciﬁcally, the CSS asks: “If you needed money during the next six months, how much would parents or
other family be willing and able to give you?” We focus on whether the borrower reports that he/she could expect
to receive $2,500 or more from parents/family – a modest sum but enough to cover up to a year of typical monthly
loan payments. In Appendix C, we consider a broader measure of parental assistance that includes the ability of
students to move back in with their parents. Based on this broader measure of parental assistance, approximately
85% of all borrowers can count on ﬁnancial transfers of at least $2,500, can move back in with their parents, or
already live with them. Results using this alternative measure are qualitatively consistent with those discussed in
the paper.
30
The CSS also asks respondents what they think would happen to their credit rating if they did not repay their
CSLP loans. We created an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the borrower reports that not paying
would make borrowing much more diﬃcult or impossible. Using this indicator in place of the indicator describing
whether resondents would stop paying their CSLP loan ﬁrst yields very similar conclusions to those reported in
the text.

17

4

Empirical Importance of Financial Resources for Stu
dent Loan Repayment

This section examines the empirical importance of ﬁnancial resources for student loan repayment,
emphasizing the roles of expected parental transfers and personal savings. The relationship
between these ﬁnancial resources and repayment (for individuals with the same level of debt)
provides new evidence about the types of informal insurance individuals may have against poor
labor market outcomes after leaving school. As detailed in Proposition 3, this relationship is also
informative about the presence of non-monetary costs of applying for and enrolling in repayment
assistance. We discuss the implications of these costs for student loan policy in Section 5.

4.1

Parental Transfers and Savings

Table 2 documents the probability that borrowers experience repayment problems for our three
measures of available resources: post-school earnings, expected parental transfers, and personal
savings. In all cases, repayment problems are lower for borrowers with greater available resources.
For example, repayment problems for borrowers earning less than $20,000 (41.0%) are almost three
times more likely than those earning $20,000-$40,000 (15.3%) and 17 times more likely than those
earning more than $40,000 (2.4%). Borrowers who have expected parental transfers of less than
$2,500 are three times as likely to experience a repayment problem as those who can expect at
least $2,500 in help if they need it (32.2% vs. 10.5%). Finally, borrowers with little or no savings
(less than $1,000) are ﬁve times as likely to experience a repayment problem as those with at
least $1,000 in savings (43.7% vs. 8.7%).
Recognizing that these diﬀerent types of resources may be correlated with each other, as well
as other factors that determine loan repayment, we estimate a linear probability model in which
repayment problems are allowed to depend on our resource measures as well as student debt, ed
ucational attainment, reported beliefs about the importance of repaying student loans, whether
the borrower had attended a private post-secondary institution, province indicators, and demo
graphic variables. These other ‘baseline determinants’ may aﬀect repayment behavior conditional
on debt and ﬁnancial resources due to individual diﬀerences in expected costs associated with
delinquency, default, or enrolling in repayment assistance.
Table 3 reports least squares estimates of the linear probability model for several diﬀerent
speciﬁcations.31 In column 1, we exclude all forms of available resources to see how student
debt and our ‘baseline determinants’ inﬂuence repayment. Column 2 also includes indicators
for all available categories of the borrower’s current earnings. Consistent with the model of
Section 2 and previous research (Gross et al., 2009; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2015), the
probability of a repayment problem is signiﬁcantly increasing in student debt. The estimated
31

Average marginal eﬀects from analogous Probit models are similar.
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eﬀect of graduating university with a 4 year degree (or more) is moderate when not accounting
for earnings, but it becomes small and statistically insigniﬁcant once we condition on post-school
earnings in column 2. This is not surprising, since one would expect that educational attainment
largely aﬀects repayment through earnings and accumulated debt. Repayment problems are more
likely among borrowers who attended a private for-proﬁt post-secondary institution even after
conditioning on post-school earnings.32 Other ‘baseline determinants’, including reported beliefs
about the importance of student loan repayment, have only modest and statistically insigniﬁcant
eﬀects on repayment problems.
We are mainly interested in the role of ﬁnancial resources. Column 2 of Table 3 shows that
even after conditioning on student debt, schooling, and many other factors, we estimate strong
eﬀects of the borrower’s own earnings on student loan repayment problems, with a sizeable jump
occurring around $20,000. Borrowers with no earnings, borrowers with yearly earnings between $1
and $10,000, and borrowers with yearly earnings between $10,000 and $20,000 are 55 percentage
points, 44 percentage points, and 37 percentage points, respectively, more likely to experience a
repayment problem than borrowers earning more than $40,000 (the omitted category).33
Despite the importance of post-school earnings for student loan repayment, nearly 60% of
borrowers with annual earnings below $20,000 still manage to make timely CSLP payments (see
Table 2). Our theoretical analysis in Section 2.2 suggests that other resources not taken into
account by the CSLP (in determining income-based payments) may explain why. The next few
columns of Table 3 demonstrate that additional resources in the form of parental support and
personal savings also play critical roles in enabling repayment.
Column 3 includes measures of access to parental support (at least $2,500) and personal
savings (at least $1,000), in addition to the baseline determinants (without controlling for own
post-school earnings). Both access to parental support and savings substantially reduce the
likelihood of repayment problems. Highlighting the importance of these additional resources, the
R-squared statistics at the bottom of the table reveal that accounting for savings and parental
support explains a similar share of the variation in repayment problems as does accounting for the
borrower’s own earnings (i.e., compare columns 2 and 3). In column 4, we simultaneously control
for post-school earnings, parental support, and savings. Access to parental support reduces the
likelihood of a repayment problem by 14 percentage points, while access to savings reduces the
likelihood by 25 percentage points. The estimates in column 5 suggest that the added beneﬁt from
having access to both parental support and savings (vs. just one of these) is modest. Relative
to having access to neither savings nor parental support, having access to only parental support
reduces the likelihood of a repayment problem by 25 percentage points, having access to only
32

The estimated eﬀects of private for-proﬁt attendance are signiﬁcant at the .05 level in column 1 and 0.10 level
in column 2.
33
Using very similar data from the CSLP’s Defaulter Survey, we have also shown elsewhere that defaulters are
signiﬁcantly more likely to return to good standing if they experience increases in earnings relative to when they
entered default (Lochner et al., 2013).
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savings reduces the likelihood of a repayment problem by 31 percentage points, and having access
to both reduces the likelihood of a repayment problem by 37 (= 25.3 + 31.1 − 19.5) percentage
points.
Consistent with our theoretical framework, Figure 2 shows that parental support and savings
are particularly important for borrowers with low post-school earnings. Only 4% of low-earning
borrowers (i.e. borrowers earning less than $20,000) with access to both parental assistance and
savings experience repayment problems. However, the rate of repayment problems is much higher,
26%, for low-earning borrowers with access to only one form of additional ﬁnancial resources (i.e.,
parental assistance or savings, but not both), and nearly 60% of low-earning borrowers with access
to neither parental support nor savings experience a repayment problem.
Among borrowers earning at least $20,000, Figure 2 shows that only 5% with access to both
parental assistance and savings and 7% of those with access to only one of these additional
resources experience repayment problems. Among these higher-earning borrowers with neither
parental support nor savings, repayment problems are more common at 31%, but still much
less common than among their low-earning counterparts. While these results suggest a role for
parental assistance and savings in reducing repayment problems even among those with moderate
to high earnings, that role is considerably muted relative to that observed for those with lower
earnings. In particular, the added beneﬁt from access to a second form of additional resources
(i.e. both savings and parental support vs. just one) is negligible for higher earners.
In Table 4, we estimate the importance of parental assistance and savings for low-earning bor
rowers (less than $20,000/year) accounting for other possible determinants of repayment problems
(as studied previously in Table 3). Consistent with Table 3 and Figure 2, we estimate that both
parental transfers and savings substantially reduce the likelihood of repayment problems. Based
on the estimates in column 2, relative to having access to neither parental support nor savings,
having access to only parental support decreases the likelihood of a repayment problem by 22
percentage points, having access to only savings decreases the likelihood of a repayment prob
lem by 41 percentage points, and having access to both decreases the likelihood of a repayment
problem by 49 (= 41.3 + 22.4 − 14.6) percentage points.
Altogether, these results suggest that parental assistance and savings serve as critical sources
of ‘insurance’ for borrowers in the event that they experience periods of low earnings or un
employment after leaving school. Borrowers with low earnings and no access to other resources
(from savings or parents) are more likely than not to experience some form of repayment problem.
However, low-earners with modest savings and parental support are very unlikely to experience
repayment problems. In light of Proposition 3, these results suggest that non-monetary veriﬁ
cation/application costs are an important factor in repayment decisions. We explore the policy
implications of these costs in Section 5.
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4.2

Parental Income and Repayment Problems

Sections 2 and 4.1, respectively, describe the conceptual and empirical importance of our novel
measure of parental transfers. Given that parental income is often observed in administrative
data, it is natural to examine whether it can serve as an eﬀective proxy for parental transfers.
Table 5 reports estimates from regressions of repayment problems analogous to those of
columns 4 and 5 of Table 3, replacing measures of expected parental transfers and savings with
measures of parental income at the time students applied for aid. The omitted parental income
category is the group of independent students for whom no parental income information is avail
able. Thus, the estimated eﬀects of income for dependent students are relative to all independent
students. Column 1 of Table 5 reports estimates from the full sample and reveals that diﬀerences
in repayment problems by parental income are modest. Compared to independent students, de
pendent students with annual parental income of at least $25,000 (at the time they applied for
aid) are about 13 percentage points less likely to experience a repayment problem. The diﬀer
ence in repayment problems among dependent students from lower vs. higher parental income
backgrounds is much smaller (about 4 percentage points). Comparing the R-squared for this
speciﬁcation (0.239) with that reported in column 2 of Table 3 (0.227) suggests that account
ing for parental income explains relatively little of the variation in repayment across borrowers
with similar backgrounds, debt, and earnings.34 This contrasts sharply with the speciﬁcations
in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3, which account for diﬀerences in expected parental transfers and
savings and show substantially greater R-squared statistics (0.312 and 0.321, respectively).
Why is parental income so much less predictive of repayment problems than expected transfers
and savings? In addition to the fact that parental incomes may change between the time students
apply for aid and the ﬁrst few years of loan repayment, post-school parental support need not
be tightly linked to parental income. Parental transfers are not only based on parents’ ability to
help their children, which would tend to be reﬂected in parental income, but they also depend on
parents’ willingness to help, which would not necessarily be reﬂected in parental income. Indeed,
column 2 of Table 5 shows that parental income is irrelevant for repayment among the subset of
borrowers who do not expect any support from their parents, while Column 3 shows that parental
income reduces repayment problems among those borrowers who report that they could receive
at least some support from their parents if they needed it. Altogether, this evidence suggests that
parental income (at least when students ﬁrst apply for aid) is, at best, a weak proxy for actual
post-school parental support.
34

Controlling for additional parental income categories does not change this conclusion. For example, the Rsquared statistic is unchanged (to the third decimal place) when adding another indicator for parental income of
at least $50,000.
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5

Implications for Canada’s Repayment Assistance

Our empirical results showing the importance of parental support and savings for student loan
repayment have direct implications for the design of government student loan programs. Most
notably, they suggest that the non-monetary costs of earnings veriﬁcation (or repayment assis
tance take-up more generally) are likely to be sizeable, buttressing concerns by some that the
seemingly low enrolment in income-based repayment plans may be due to hassles involved in the
application/veriﬁcation process (Government Accountability Oﬃce, 2015). Concerns about these
costs have led some to call for streamlining the application process or abolishing it altogether (as
in Australia and the United Kingdom) through automatic enrolment in income-based repayment
schemes (Dynarski and Kreisman, 2013).
In this section, we begin by discussing the implications of reducing or eliminating nonmonetary veriﬁcation/application costs using the economic model developed in Section 2.2. We
then use our administrative and CSS data on student borrowing, repayment, and earnings, as well
as longitudinal data on student debt and earnings from Canada’s Survey of Labour and Income
Dynamics (SLID) to empirically study the implications of making enrolment in the CSLP’s RAP
automatic. We refer to this potential program as ‘Universal RAP’.

5.1

Eﬀects of Lowering Non-Monetary Veriﬁcation Costs: Theory

Using our model of government student loan programs from Section 2.2, we can study the eﬀects
of reducing non-monetary veriﬁcation costs ψ on repayments. Notice that
dΦ(ỹ(d; τ, θ, ψ)|e)
∂ỹ
∂ỹ ∂d Φ(ỹ|e) ∂e
= φ(ỹ|e)
+ φ(ỹ|e)
+
.
dψ
∂ψ
∂d ∂ψ
∂e ∂ψ

(10)

Consider, ﬁrst, the short-term impacts of lowering veriﬁcation costs ψ on borrowers who have
already entered the labor market. Their debt and eﬀort choices have already been made. Only
the ﬁrst (direct) eﬀect of ψ on the threshold ỹ in equation (10) applies to these borrowers, so
dΦ/dψ ≤ 0 since an increase in ψ reduces ỹ whenever G(θ, d; τ ) < ψ < G(y, d; τ ).
In the long term, new borrowers will be aﬀected by a reduction in ψ, adjusting their borrow
ing and eﬀort choices. The following proposition shows that if the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property (MLRP) holds and the probability of earning the threshold amount ỹ is increasing in
eﬀort (i.e. ỹ is not too low), then debt is decreasing and eﬀort is increasing in veriﬁcation costs.35
Eﬀort is also increasing in veriﬁcation costs for eligible borrowers that always apply for reduced
income-based payments.
Proposition 4 For d < dmax , if the MLRP holds for Φ(y|e) and
the MLRP holds for Φ(y|e) and

∂φ(ỹ|e)
∂e

∂φ(ỹ|e)
∂e

≥ 0, or (ii) ψ < G(θ, d; τ ), then

35

≥ 0, then
∂e
∂ψ

∂d
∂ψ

< 0. If (i)

> 0.

Intuitively, the MLRP implies that higher
eﬀort
h
r is more likely to have been exerted when observing higher
∂φ(y|e)/∂e
∂
earnings values. Formally, it requires ∂y
> 0.
φ(y|e)
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Intuitively, an increase in veriﬁcation costs encourages eﬀort, since exerting higher eﬀort reduces
the likelihood that earnings are low and veriﬁcation is needed (holding constant the veriﬁcation
threshold). Borrowers also reduce their veriﬁcation threshold when G(θ, d; τ ) < ψ < G(y, d; τ ).
As long as increases in borrowing do not strongly encourage eﬀort, the reduction in ỹ further
encourages eﬀort and discourages borrowing. The stated conditions ensure that this is the case.
Given the results of Proposition 4, it is straightforward to see from equation (10) how changes
in veriﬁcation costs aﬀect the probability of a repayment reduction in the long-term when bor
rowing and eﬀort respond. Among borrowers with ψ < G(θ, d; τ ), ỹ = θ is ﬁxed and increases
in veriﬁcation costs reduce the likelihood of a repayment reduction through an increase in eﬀort:
dΦ(ỹ|e)
∂e
= ∂Φ(ỹ|e)
< 0. Among borrowers with G(θ, d; τ ) < ψ < G(y, d; τ ), if the MLRP holds
dψ
∂e
∂ψ
and φ(ỹ|e) is increasing in eﬀort, then an increase in veriﬁcation costs will cause them to lower
their veriﬁcation threshold (directly due to the increase in ψ and indirectly due to reductions in
borrowing). This, along with an increase in eﬀort, reduces the likelihood that they apply for a
payment reduction.
Except for borrowers with G(y, d; τ ) < ψ who always repay the standard amount, a decline
in non-monetary veriﬁcation costs will typically lead to an increase in the use of income-based
payments. The long-term eﬀects of such a change are likely to be greater than the short-term
eﬀects, since new borrowers will respond by increasing the amount they borrow and reducing
their eﬀort during school or in the labor market. Both of these eﬀects further increase the use of
income-based payments.

5.2

Distributional and Eﬃciency Eﬀects of Eliminating Veriﬁcation
Costs

Next, we brieﬂy discuss the distributional and eﬃciency implications of eliminating all veriﬁcation
costs within the context of our model, before quantitatively examining the short-term eﬀects of
making enrolment in Canada’s RAP automatic.
Fully eliminating veriﬁcation costs (from ψ > 0 to zero) would have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
probability of making reduced payments depending on student debt and transfer levels. Consider
the short-run eﬀects (holding debt and eﬀort ﬁxed) for three distinct groups. First, repayment
decisions for borrowers with high debt and few parental transfers (satisfying G(θ, d; τ ) ≥ ψ)
would be unaﬀected by the elimination of veriﬁcation costs, since they already apply for reduced
payments whenever eligible. Second, borrowers with intermediate levels of debt and parental
transfers (satisfying G(θ, d; τ ) < ψ < G(y, d; τ )) would respond to the elimination of veriﬁcation
costs by increasing the rate at which they apply for reduced payments, with the largest increases
occurring for those with high parental transfers. Third, borrowers with low debt and high parental
transfers (satisfying G(y, d; τ ) ≤ ψ) initially choose not to apply for reduced payments regardless
of their earnings. It would now become optimal for these borrowers to apply for reduced payments
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for at least some earnings realizations. The probability of making reduced payments would
increase more among those with high levels of debt but would not depend on parental transfers.
Altogether, the probability of making reduced payments would increase the most for borrowers
with high parental transfers and low levels of debt. Reductions in payment amounts would be
small for those with low levels of debt, but they could be sizeable for borrowers with higher levels
of debt and considerable parental support.
The implied reductions in repayment amounts present an important challenge for initiatives
that reduce non-monetary veriﬁcation costs within the existing student loan system.36 Revenue
losses could be made up by raising the interest rate; however, this would reduce the welfare of
individuals who repay in full. Ex post, lowering veriﬁcation costs would transfer resources from
borrowers with high earnings realizations to those with lower realizations, especially to those
with substantial parental support. Ex ante, it would produce an expected transfer from youth
with little parental support to those with greater support. This ex ante redistribution is likely
undesirable.
Aside from redistribution concerns, there are several eﬃciency considerations. On the one
hand, lowering veriﬁcation costs would directly beneﬁt all borrowers who would sometimes choose
lower income-based payments. This beneﬁt must be weighed against the costs associated with
higher interest rates (assuming the program must maintain its current budget).37 With hetero
geneity in earnings potential, borrowers with high expected earnings would face a higher expected
repayment. For some borrowers, this additional cost may outweigh the beneﬁts of reduced veriﬁ
cation costs in low earnings states. Even with all borrowers ex ante identical, it is possible that a
poorly structured loan program with easy eligibility criteria and modest income-based payments
would result in very few borrowers repaying in full at very high interest rates. Even ignoring
the potential for over-borrowing in such an environment, it is possible that imposing modest
non-monetary veriﬁcation costs would encourage enough borrowers to repay their loans in full,
allowing for signiﬁcant reductions in interest rates. Indeed, the following proposition shows that
ψ > 0 can be eﬃcient under a student loan program that oﬀers pure forgiveness when earnings
are low (i.e. ξ(y) = 0 for all y < θ).
Proposition 5 Assume ex ante identical agents, quadratic preferences, and no moral hazard.
Under a break-even student loan program with pure forgiveness and a low eligibility threshold
θ > y, it is eﬃcient to impose strictly positive veriﬁcation costs if optimal debt (when ψ = 0)
exceeds 2βE[y − y].
36

For simplicity, this discussion abstracts from the option of default. If veriﬁcation costs were eliminated,
some borrowers currently in default might make reduced income-based payments instead. As shown below, the
potential revenue implications of this are likely to be quite small in practice, since most borrowers in default have
low earnings and face very low (or zero) income-based payments.
37
Alternatively, other changes in the structure of repayments (e.g. eligibility threshold or income-based repay
ment amounts) could be made to collect more revenue. We discuss this further below.
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Appendix E.6 provides a proof of this result, as well as additional details on the tradeoﬀs relevant
to the optimal choice of ψ in the general case.
The potential welfare value of ψ > 0 derives from two key shortcomings of the current system.38
First, the failure to account for parental transfers means that it may be welfare-improving to
exclude youth from rich families from income-based payments, since they gain little from the
implied insurance. Imposing non-monetary veriﬁcation costs is one way to do this.39 Second,
even if τ = 0 for everyone, the structure of loan contracts could be ineﬃcient with ‘too many’
borrowers eligible for and taking up the reduced income-based payments. Veriﬁcation costs can
be used to reduce the set of borrowers who choose to apply.40
Of course, imposing non-monetary veriﬁcation costs (e.g. lengthy and complicated application
forms, waiting periods) is a socially wasteful means to exclude some borrowers from payment
reductions. Adjustments in repayment functions ξ(y) and/or the eligibility threshold θ are likely
to be more eﬃcient; however, they cannot easily address the issue of targeting assistance primarily
to borrowers without external support. In Section 6, we discuss the design of loan contracts that
address the shortcomings of current student loan programs by eﬃciently setting loan limits,
standard payments, payment reductions, and the eligibility/veriﬁcation threshold based on all
available information.

5.3

Eﬀects of Moving to a ‘Universal RAP’ on Loan Repayments

We now consider the potential implications of moving to a ‘Universal RAP’ for CSLP revenues.41
In particular, we examine how payments (based on earnings and debt levels) would change if all
borrowers were automatically enrolled in RAP and made the expected payments under RAP (i.e.,
the lesser of the RAP amount based on their earnings and the standard payment).
Two groups of borrowers would be most directly aﬀected by such a move. First, many lowearning borrowers may see their payments reduced. Under the current system, many of these
borrowers make their standard payments even though they are eligible for much lower (or zero)
payments under RAP. This may reﬂect high costs associated with RAP enrollment or a lack of
38

This discussion assumes that lenders could eliminate veriﬁcation costs for borrowers without incurring any new
expenses. Of course, some costs are likely inherent to the veriﬁcation process or might not be freely eliminated.
In this respect, it is notable that government student loan programs in both Canada and the U.S. do not take
advantage of information about borrower’s earnings already collected by the government in other contexts (e.g.
for purposes of taxation, social security, unemployment insurance). By contrast, loan collections in Australia are
done in concert with the tax system.
39
See Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) for a related discussion of targeting transfers for redistribution purposes.
40
See Diamond (1984) for a related point on the potential value of imposing non-pecuniary penalties (not
captured by lenders) as an eﬃcient way to improve loan contracts. Unlike the current setting, he considers the
eﬃcient design of contracts constrained by non-negative consumption for borrowers. The penalties allow lenders
to punish borrowers beyond where there consumption goes to zero in some states, allowing for lower payments in
other states.
41
This would reduce enrolment costs associated with applying for and participating in RAP and would also
alleviate concerns that some eligible borrowers are unaware of the option. This can be viewed as an extension of
several recent CSLP initiatives meant to streamline application for and to facilitate use of RAP.
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information about the program coupled with access to other resources like parental support or
savings that make lower payments unnecessary. Second, some low-earning borrowers that are
currently delinquent or in default may instead choose to make lower income-based payments.
The main revenue implications of moving to a ‘Universal RAP’ program, therefore, depend on
the balance of reduced payments from low-earning borrowers currently making standard payments
against the potential increased revenue from encouraging current delinquents/defaulters to make
some (potentially small) payments.
We use two data sources to explore the potential CSLP revenue eﬀects of moving to a ‘Universal
RAP’. We begin by using our 2011 and 2012 CSS sample. These data are ideally suited for this
task, because they allow us to determine current loan payments (using administrative records on
loan amounts and repayment status) as well as counterfactual payments under ‘Universal RAP’
(using survey reports of earnings and administrative loan amounts). The main limitation of these
data is that they only provide a snapshot of earnings during the ﬁrst two years of repayment
for our sample respondents; yet, earnings may be unusually low during these early years due to
the transition from school to work. We, therefore, exploit data from Canada’s SLID to study
potential repayment and revenue eﬀects of a ‘Universal RAP’ over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of borrowers’
post-school labor market experience. These longitudinal data contain information on the amount
borrowed for school and annual post-school earnings; however, they do not contain information
on actual payments. With these data, we compare potential payments under a ‘Universal RAP’
with standard debt-based payment amounts.
5.3.1

A Few Details on CSLP’s Repayment Assistance Plan

Before simulating the eﬀects of moving to automatic enrolment in Canada’s RAP, we brieﬂy
describe key features of the program and student loan repayment in Canada more generally.42
Canadians borrowing from the CSLP can choose to apply for repayment assistance if they
are currently in good standing on their loan and have suﬃciently low earnings. Under Canada’s
RAP, eligible borrowers are expected to pay a fraction of their current earnings above a threshold
– from zero to 20% based on their earnings – towards their student loan. As documented in Ap
pendix D, these income-based payment amounts are greater than under the analogous American
“Pay-as-you-Earn” (PAYE) income-contingent repayment scheme and in other countries with uni
versal income-contingent loan programs like Australia and the United Kingdom.43 Notably, the
income-based amount is zero for single, childless borrowers with monthly earnings below $1,685
(annual earnings of roughly $20,000). In 2010-11, nearly 90% of the 165,000 RAP recipients
42

In late 2016, RAP shifted the required repayment schedule, so that childless, single borrowers do not need to
make any payments if their annual earnings fall below $25,000 (up from around $20,000). We discuss and study
the program structure prior to that change, which we refer to as ‘current’ RAP since that structure covered the
period we study.
43
The American PAYE plan links payments to earnings for 20 years, forgiving any remaining debt.
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faced a zero monthly payment (Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary, 2010). If the income-based payment
amount exceeds the standard debt-based amount, RAP recipients are only responsible for the
lower standard amount. During the early portion of the repayment period (Stage 1 of RAP), if
the calculated RAP payment is less than the interest accumulating on their debt that period, the
federal government pays the remaining interest amount, so the principal does not grow. After
ﬁve years of reduced payments, borrowers move to Stage 2 of RAP, and the government eﬀec
tively forgives the full diﬀerence between any reduced RAP payment and the expected standard
repayment amount.44 Participating borrowers are debt-free after ﬁfteen years.
5.3.2

Using the CSS

We use the administrative loan records combined with earnings reported in the CSS to measure
the revenue eﬀects under a ‘Universal RAP’ relative to the current CSLP regime. We consider a
best-case ﬁscal scenario for ‘Universal RAP’ by assuming that all borrowers would always make
their calculated payments under this counterfactual regime. That is, payments under ‘Universal
RAP’ are set equal to the lesser of the income-based RAP amount and their actual scheduled
payment, regardless of the borrower’s current repayment status.45 In calculating payments under
the current regime, we use borrowers’ scheduled payment as given by administrative records if
they are currently in good standing or on RAP and zero if they are currently delinquent or in
default.
Figure 3 reports the distribution of monthly payments under these two regimes. Our calcula
tions suggest that the fraction of borrowers paying zero would nearly double under a ‘Universal
RAP’ regime, since many low-earning borrowers currently making their loan payments would
not be expected to make any RAP payments. This highlights the role of additional resources
(i.e., savings and parental support) in enabling repayment for many low-earning borrowers. Au
tomatically placing all of these borrowers on RAP would signiﬁcantly reduce their repayment
obligations. Our calculations further suggest that average monthly payments (including pay
ments of zero) over the ﬁrst two years of repayment would decline by nearly half from $130 to
$68 for recent school-leavers if RAP were made universal. If persistent, a decline in revenue of
this magnitude would likely threaten the viability of CSLP.
5.3.3

Using SLID

It is possible to extend the timeframe of our ‘Universal RAP’ analysis to cover the ﬁrst ﬁve
years of borrower’s post-school careers using SLID. Panel 5 of SLID contains longitudinal data
on earnings, schooling, and the amount borrowed for post-secondary education covering the years
44

See Appendix D for further details.
To simplify the calculation of payments under RAP, we focus on single borrowers with no children (the majority
of our sample), since the threshold earnings level above which RAP payments begin depends on household size.
See Appendix D for further details.
45
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2005-2010. For comparability with our previous analysis, we limit our sample to all individuals in
SLID who attended some post-secondary schooling, reported borrowing for school, and left school
by age 30. We date observations based on the year individuals are observed leaving school, and we
calculate both debt-based payments and ‘Universal RAP’ payments based on their outstanding
student loan amount when they left school and their earnings each year after leaving school.
We, therefore, observe ﬁve post-school earnings measures for those leaving school in 2005, four
measures for those leaving in 2006, and so on.
Table 6 reports measures of the earnings distribution by educational attainment and years
since leaving post-secondary school for all borrowers in our sample. About 45% of borrowers
with less than a four-year university degree earned less than $20,000 in their ﬁrst year out of
school compared to only 27% of four-year degree recipients. While earnings tend to increase
over time, many students still earn less than $20,000 four to ﬁve years after leaving school –
especially among those with less than a four-year degree. Table 7 calculates the ratio of expected
RAP payments to debt-based payments each year after school based on the amount borrowed
and post-school earnings.46 Consistent with our results from the CSS, calculated RAP payments
are substantially lower than debt-based payments, ranging from 56% of the debt-based amount
in year 1 to 68% in year 5. Because earnings levels are higher in this SLID sample than in the
CSS sample, the implied RAP payments are also a bit higher here.47 Table 7 reveals that nearly
40% of all borrowers would be asked to pay nothing during their ﬁrst year out of school under a
‘Universal RAP’; nearly 30% would still not be expected to make any payments ﬁve years out of
school.
These ﬁgures are not necessarily alarming if low-earnings states are highly transitory, since
borrowers may only require reduced payment amounts for one or two years. In this case, they may
take a few extra years to pay oﬀ their loan, but long-term losses (e.g. forgiven interest payments)
may be fairly minor. However, the structure of RAP is such that borrowers receiving reduced
payments for more than 60 months begin to see reductions in their debt burden equal to the
diﬀerence between the RAP amount and what they would otherwise be expected to pay based on
their debt level. Thus, it is important to know whether the RAP payment reductions observed
over years 1-5 in Table 7 represent reductions for diﬀerent borrowers each year or reductions for
the same subset of borrowers year after year. Fortunately, the longitudinal nature of SLID allows
us to explore this issue.
In Table 8, we show the discounted present value of RAP payments relative to debt-based
46

The smaller sample sizes in Table 7 relative to Table 6 reﬂect the fact that some respondents did not report
a student loan amount even though they report that they had taken out a student loan. Table 6 includes these
individuals, while Table 7 does not.
47
The higher earnings in SLID relative to the CSS are not surprising given that the Canadian labor market was
in much worse shape in 2011-12 (CSS) than it was in 2006-08 (SLID) due to the Great Recession. Unemployment
rates for 25-29 year olds ranged from 5.9-6.3% in 2006-08 but were as high as 8.0% in 2011. The measures may
also diﬀer somewhat, because the CSS asked respondents about their current (annualized) earnings at the time of
the survey, while SLID asks about actual earnings over the previous year.
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payments over the ﬁrst three, four, and ﬁve years after leaving school.48 The ﬁrst row shows
that borrowers would repay only 55-60% of the total debt-based amount under ‘Universal RAP’.
Roughly 40% of all borrowers would pay less than half the debt-based amount after ﬁve years,
while only one-in-four would pay the full amount. While not shown in the table, 15% of all
borrowers would make zero payments over the ﬁrst four years under ‘Universal RAP’.
Unlike with the CSS, we are unable to use SLID to determine actual payments under the
current system where some borrowers are delinquent, default, or make reduced payments by
signing up for RAP. However, these results indicate that our CSS results do not simply reﬂect
very short-term problems associated with the transition from school to work. Many borrowers
experience very low earnings for several years after leaving school.
5.3.4

General Discussion and Caveats

These calculations are only illustrative and come with a few important caveats. First, it is possible
that some low-earning borrowers would continue to make higher payments than required by RAP
even if their automatic payments were reduced. Second, many currently delinquent borrowers
may continue to remain delinquent under a ‘Universal RAP’; however, the implications of this are
likely to be modest since expected RAP payments for many of these borrowers are very low or zero
given their incomes. Third and most importantly, these calculations do not factor in any dynamic
long-run eﬀects (beyond the ﬁrst ﬁve years after school) a move to ‘Universal RAP’ might entail.
If the program keeps borrowers better connected with CSLP, it could ultimately result in higher
lifetime payments among borrowers who temporarily experience poor labor market outcomes
after leaving school. Even in this case, however, government interest payments for many RAP
recipients who do not make payments for several years can add up. Of much greater concern
are the payment reductions that would be granted to the many borrowers who reach Stage 2 of
RAP due to persistently low earnings. Under the current system, nearly half of all borrowers
who enter RAP shortly after leaving school remain on RAP more or less continuously for at
least ﬁve years and enter Stage 2 in their sixth year (Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary, 2014). Our
simulations suggest similar patterns might be expected for the larger set of borrowers that would
participate in RAP if enrolment were made automatic. Unfortunately, a full accounting of the
long-run eﬀects of a ‘Universal RAP’ would require better longitudinal data than is currently
available and is, therefore, beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, our ﬁndings provide
strong evidence that caution is warranted when considering policies that dramatically increase
the take-up of income-based repayment.49
48

In calculating present values, we use a discount rate of 2.1%, which is the government cost of borrowing for
the CSLP (Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary, 2010). Results are nearly identical for an interest rate of 5.5%, which
corresponds to the interest rate paid by the vast majority of borrowers who choose the ﬂoating rate.
49
Our calculations also abstract from potential behavioral changes that might aﬀect borrower earnings due to
moral hazard or adverse selection; levels of borrowing might also adjust. (See Proposition 4.) These eﬀects would
likely increase the costs of moving to a ‘Universal RAP’ system.
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It is important to note that these results do not imply that income-based repayment schemes
are inherently bad or that they should be scaled back. Instead, they shine a light on important
shortcomings in the design of current student loan programs. These problems can be ameliorated
by re-thinking the overall structure of student loan contracts, an issue we turn to next.

6

A (Constrained) Eﬃcient Student Loan Program

We now consider the design of student loan programs that eﬃciently set loan amounts and
repayment functions to maximize student welfare subject to breaking even in expectation.
Consistent with our analysis and evidence above, we consider (constrained) eﬃcient contracts
in the presence of non-monetary income veriﬁcation costs ψ > 0. We also incorporate unobserved
eﬀort (i.e. moral hazard), which is likely to be present. Our analysis focuses mainly on the case
in which parental transfers τ are easily observed by the lender; however, we brieﬂy discuss the
case of hidden transfers in Subsection 6.2. The main points we wish to make apply in both cases;
however, details of eﬃcient contracts can certainly depend on the observability of transfers.
For expositional purposes, we assume that the lender’s discount factor equals the student’s
discount factor β. In the absence of any market frictions, the optimal contract would provide full
insurance, equating consumption across time and all post-school earnings realizations. This is
not possible in the presence of non-monetary veriﬁcation costs and moral hazard, which restrict
the extent of consumption smoothing that can be achieved.50

6.1

Observed Parental Transfers

We begin by considering the case in which the government lender can observe parental transfers.
For any given borrower, the (constrained) eﬃcient contract can be written such that the
lender chooses the loan amount d, post-school repayment Dv (y) contingent on y when earnings
¯ when earnings are not veriﬁed, and a threshold ȳ below which
are veriﬁed, a ﬁxed repayment D
earnings are veriﬁed to maximize expected utility:
⎡
⎤
�y¯
�∞
⎢
⎥
¯
u(w − T + d) + β ⎣ [u(y + τ − Dv (y)) − ψ]φ(y|e)dy + u(y + τ − D)φ(y|e)dy
− v(e)⎦ , (11)
y

y¯

subject to the following break-even constraint for the lender:
⎡
⎤
�∞
�y¯
⎢
⎥
¯
d ≤ β ⎣ Dv (y)φ(y|e)dy + Dφ(y|e)dy
⎦.
y

(12)

y¯

50

See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2016) for eﬃcient student loan contracts in the presence of moral hazard,
limited commitment, and monetary costs of income veriﬁcation. They do not consider non-monetary veriﬁcation
costs or unobservable transfers.
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Unlike with current student loan programs, lenders earn zero expected proﬁts on every borrower,
and there is no ex ante redistribution across borrower types.
For simplicity, we consider two eﬀort levels with eL < eH . When high eﬀort is optimal, it
must be induced. The contract is, therefore, constrained by the following incentive compatibility
constraint:
�ȳ

[u(y+τ −Dv (y))−ψ][φ(y|eH )−φ(y|eL )]dy+

y

�∞
u(y+τ −D̄)[φ(y|eH )−φ(y|eL )]dy ≥ v(eH )−v(eL ).
ȳ

(13)
Finally, borrowers must be indiﬀerent between verifying their earnings to receive a reduced
payment and paying the ﬁxed amount D̄ at the threshold ȳ, so
¯
u(y + τ − Dv (y)) − ψ = u(ȳ + τ − D).

(14)

¯ as a function of ȳ. Substituting in for D
¯ into the contracting problem,
This implicitly deﬁnes D
lenders choose d, Dv (y) for all y < ȳ, and ȳ to maximize equation (11) subject to equations (12)
and (13) for e = eH when high eﬀort is optimal. We focus on this case, brieﬂy commenting on
allocations when low eﬀort may be eﬃcient.
Let µ ≥ 0 reﬂect the (discounted by β) Lagrange multiplier on the incentive compatibility
constraint (13), and deﬁne the likelihood ratio f(y) ≡ φL (y)/φH (y). The ﬁrst order conditions
for d and Dv (z) imply that
ue (c1 ) = ue (cv2 (y))[1 + µ(1 − f(y))], ∀y < y.
¯
Assuming that the likelihood ratio f(y) is decreasing in y (i.e. monotone likelihood ratio property),
post-school consumption is strictly increasing in earnings whenever they are veriﬁed. Of course,
consumption is also increasing (one-for-one) in earnings at higher levels when a ﬁxed repayment
is made (i.e. y ≥ ȳ). Thus, moral hazard restricts the amount of insurance that can be provided
for low earnings realizations, while veriﬁcation costs prohibit any insurance across higher earnings
levels.51 Finally, notice that equation (14) implies that consumption must jump discontinuously
at the veriﬁcation threshold due to the veriﬁcation costs. Borrowers must be oﬀered higher
consumption to compensate for the utility costs of veriﬁcation, which means that loan payments
¯ See Appendix E.7 for
must drop when borrowers apply for reduced payments (i.e. Dv (ȳ) < D).
the condition determining the optimal veriﬁcation threshold ȳ and other details.
¯
While not emphasized thus far, it is noteworthy that optimal loan contracts (d, y,
¯ Dv (y), D)
depend on initial wealth and parental transfers (w, τ ), as well as any other individual factors like
ability that might aﬀect earnings functions or preferences. Clearly, an increase in total wealth due
51

In the absence of moral hazard (or if low eﬀort is optimal), µ = 0 and there would be perfect consumption
smoothing across the schooling period and all veriﬁed post-school earnings outcomes.
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to increases in w or τ would lead to greater consumption c1 and cv2 (y) for low earnings realizations.
An increase in parental transfers would, therefore, imply a larger loan d and higher veriﬁcation
¯ and
payment Dv (y); however, it is more diﬃcult to say how it would aﬀect the ﬁxed payment D
veriﬁcation threshold ȳ.
Comparing Current and Eﬃcient Student Loan Contracts
While eﬃciently designed student loan contracts share a similar structure with current student
loan contracts, they are much more ﬂexible. Under eﬃcient contracts, the ﬁxed repayment for high
¯ is analogous to the ‘standard payment’ Rd under current loan programs;
earnings realizations D
¯
however, the implicit interest rate D/d
depends on the actual loan amount as well as initial
resources, parental transfers and earnings functions. The eﬃcient contract speciﬁes income-based
repayments Dv (y) when earnings are veriﬁed. These payments are analogous to ξ(y) under
standard loan programs; however, Dv (y) is set eﬃciently at the individual-level and varies with
the loan amount, available resources (w, τ ), and earnings functions. Furthermore, there is a
discontinuous drop in eﬃciently determined repayments when earnings are veriﬁed (i.e. Dv (ȳ) <
D̄) to compensate borrowers for the non-monetary costs of veriﬁcation. This feature is absent
in current North American loan programs. Finally, the earnings threshold ȳ under eﬃcient
loan contracts is analogous to an eligibility threshold θ; however, setting the eligibility threshold
optimally (based on the veriﬁcation cost, loan amount, available resources, and earnings functions)
eliminates the potential discrepancy between eligibility and the desire to apply.
Altogether, eﬃcient loan contracts provide as much consumption smoothing (across time and
states) as possible, given inherent market frictions (moral hazard and veriﬁcation costs). This
directly implies that government lenders using eﬃcient contracts would prefer to eliminate all
non-monetary veriﬁcation costs.52 Indeed, if veriﬁcation costs could be freely eliminated, eﬃcient
contracts would become fully contingent on earnings and parental transfers, so the only distortion
limiting consumption insurance would be due to moral hazard.
Another important feature of the eﬃcient student loan contracts discussed here is that they
break-even (in expectation) on an individual basis depending on their available resources (w, τ )
as well as any (observable) individual-speciﬁc characteristics related to preferences or earnings
distributions (e.g. ability, college majors). Current student loan programs do not take these
factors into account, leading to ex ante redistribution across borrowers. This can have important
implications if parental transfers are not easily observed, as we discuss next.
52
Assuming veriﬁcation costs can be freely eliminated, the marginal welfare cost of ψ is Φ(ȳ|e) ≥ 0, where ȳ
and e are the optimal threshold and eﬀort levels in the eﬃcient loan contract above.
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6.2

Unobservable Parental Transfers

Current government student loan programs eﬀectively ignore parental transfers. If these transfers
were easily observed by the government, it would be straightforward to take them into account
when computing total earnings measures used in determining income-based payments. Unfortu
nately, this no longer works if parental transfers are unobservable by the government. In this
case, borrowers would have no incentive to report transfers that led to higher payments.
If post-school transfers are known by borrowers at the time they make their borrowing de
cisions, it may be possible to design eﬃcient loan contracts that induce borrowers to truthfully
report those transfers. Indeed, in the absence of moral hazard (i.e. eﬀort is observable), the ef
ﬁcient contracts derived in Section 6.1 would induce students to truthfully reveal their parental
support, since those contracts: (i) maximize student welfare conditional on parental transfers and
(ii) break-even in expectation for all borrowers.53 Together, these features imply that students
could not improve their welfare by, for example, under-reporting the amount of transfers their
parents will provide after school. While such a mis-representation might lead to lower post-school
payments, it would also reduce the loan amount oﬀered to the student.
When moral hazard is a concern and parental transfers are unobserved by the lender, borrowers
faced with the contracts derived in Section 6.1 (under the assumption of observable transfers)
may prefer to mis-represent both their eﬀort and parental transfers. Additional constraints must
be placed on the contracting problem to prevent this from happening. We show in Appendix E.7
that if high eﬀort can still be induced (with unobservable transfers), then eﬃcient contracts will be
identical to those of Section 6.1 – in this case, the unobservability of transfers does not aﬀect the
loan contract. However, it is possible that the unobservability of transfers leads to a break-down
of eﬀort-inducing contracts. In this case, loan contracts under unobservable transfers would be
written to provide full consumption smoothing across veriﬁed post-school earnings realizations and
borrowers would exert low eﬀort, whereas contracts under observable transfers would provide only
partial consumption smoothing across veriﬁed earnings realizations while inducing high eﬀort.
Despite contracts oﬀering better consumption smoothing under unobservable transfers, welfare
would be lower due to the reduction in eﬀort and, as a consequence, expected earnings and
consumption.
When parental transfers are imperfectly known at the time borrowing decisions are made, the
eﬃcient contract could simply be written as a function of (reported) expected parental trans
fers and a modiﬁed measure of borrower earnings inclusive of any realized deviation in parental
transfers from their expectation.54 If lenders could verify both earnings and transfer amounts
53

This basic point would also apply with endogenous parental transfers in that parents would always choose to
reveal their earnings and altruism.
54
Let E(τ ) reﬂect expected parental transfers and Y = y + τ − E(τ ) reﬂect the borrower’s earnings plus any
deviation from expected transfers. We can then write contracts in terms of E(τ ) and conditional density for Y ,
ΦY (Y |e), instead of τ and Φ(y|e).
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(imposing costs ψ on borrowers), the problem would be qualitatively the same as above.55

7

Conclusions

We show that many borrowers continue to make student loan payments even when they qualify
for repayment assistance based on their (low) earnings. Exploiting unique new survey data on a
broad set of resources available to student borrowers, we show that access to parental support and
personal savings are critical to making standard payments in this situation. As we demonstrate
with our economic model of current student loan programs, these ﬁndings indicate that nonmonetary costs of applying for repayment assistance are non-negligible and provide an incentive
for low-earning borrowers with access to other resources to continue making standard payments
even when they are eligible for lower income-based payments.
The roles of parental resources and savings have been largely ignored in policy discussions
related to student loans. Our analysis suggests that these resources have important implications
for proposals under current discussion to expand the use of income-contingent repayment plans.
In particular, we show that expanding the income-based RAP in Canada to automatically cover
all borrowers would reduce revenues by roughly half during the ﬁrst few years of repayment.
This is because a more universal income-based repayment scheme would signiﬁcantly reduce
repayment levels for many low-earning borrowers (with parental support and/or personal savings)
who currently make their standard payments. While it is possible that these early revenue losses
would be made up later, the strong persistence in earnings and structure of RAP suggests that
this is unlikely to be the case. At the same time, little revenue would be raised from inducing
borrowers currently in delinquency/default to make income-based payments, because the vast
majority of these borrowers have very low earnings, and, as a result, would be expected to make
very low (or zero) payments under RAP.
The revenue losses associated with making RAP enrolment automatic would likely require
notable increases in student loan interest rates (or other major program changes) to keep CSLP
viable. Given the current structure of repayment assistance, we show theoretically that such
changes could be ineﬃcient and would tend to reduce the ex ante welfare of borrowers most in
need of help. Counter-intuitively, the non-monetary costs associated with income veriﬁcation
may serve a useful purpose (under the current system) by targeting assistance to those most in
need, while collecting full repayment amounts from borrowers with access to parental support and
savings. As such, recent proposals aimed at facilitating enrolment in current repayment assistance
plans may not be welfare-improving.
Instead, our analysis suggests that eﬀorts should be made to better design student loan pro
55

This raises interesting possibilities where the costs imposed on borrowers when verifying their earnings may
diﬀer from those associated with verifying parental transfers. In this case, there may be regions where a subset of
total income (earnings or transfers) is veriﬁed with contracts contingent only on the veriﬁed component.
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grams, explicitly taking into account any inherent veriﬁcation costs and the importance of parental
support and personal savings for many borrowers. We show that an eﬃciently designed student
loan program would look broadly similar to those currently in place in Canada and the U.S.,
with ﬁxed payments above some earnings threshold and income-based payments below. However,
repayments would be structured to compensate borrowers for any veriﬁcation costs incurred and
would be better tailored to each borrower’s situation. Speciﬁcally, interest rates determining
‘standard payments’, income-based payment amounts, and the threshold determining eligibility
for reduced income-based payments would depend on the amount borrowed, reported parental
transfers, and the distribution of potential post-school earnings. With an eﬃciently designed sys
tem, there would be no beneﬁt from imposing veriﬁcation costs beyond that which are inherent
to the process itself. A well-designed program would also induce borrowers to accurately reveal
expected parental support at the time loans are taken out, with loan limits and the structure of
repayments contingent on that support.
Finally, it is worth noting that our results are not only useful for evaluating changes in student
loan policy, but they may also be helpful in explaining well-documented but not-well-understood
diﬀerences in student loan repayment behavior across individuals. In particular, our results may
help in understanding the alarmingly high default rates among African Americans (relative to
whites), even when conditioning on student debt and post-school earnings (e.g. see Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo, 2015). Previous studies document low levels of wealth conditional on earnings
for blacks relative to whites (Oliver and Shapiro, 1997; Barsky et al., 2002), suggesting that black
parents may be less equipped to provide ﬁnancial support to their children after college. As such,
African American students may have less access to the type of post-school parental insurance we
ﬁnd to be critical for student loan repayment in Canada.

References
Barsky, Robert, John Bound, Kerwin Charles, and Joseph P Lupton (2002) “Accounting for the
Black–White Wealth Gap: A Nonparametric Approach,” Journal of the American Statistical
Association, Vol. 97, pp. 663–673.
Chatterjee, Satyajit and Felicia Ionescu (2012) “Insuring Student Loans Against the Financial
Risk of Failing to Complete College,” Quantitative Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 393–420.
Cunha, Flavio and James Heckman (2016) “Decomposing trends in inequality in earnings into
forecastable and uncertain components,” Journal of labor economics, Vol. 34, pp. S31–S65.
Department of Education (2017) Student Loans Overview: Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Proposal,
Washington DC.
Dynarski, Mark (1994) “Who Defaults on Student Loans? Findings from the National Postsec
ondary Student Aid Study,” Economics of Education Review, Vol. 13, pp. 55–68.
35

Dynarski, Susan and Daniel Kreisman (2013) “Loans for Educational Opportunity: Making Bor
rowing Work for Today’s Students,” The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2013-05.
Edwards, Kathryn A (2015) “Who Helps the Unemployed? Young Workers’ Receipt of Private
Cash Transfers,” Working Paper.
Employment and Social Development Canada (2016) Canada Student Loans Program: Statistical
Review 2014-2015, Ottawa.
Flint, Thomas A (1997) “Predicting Student Loan Defaults,” The Journal of Higher Education,
Vol. 68, pp. 322–354.
Friedman, Milton and Simon Kuznets (1954) Income from Independent Professional Practice,
NBER Books: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Gary-Bobo, Robert J and Alain Trannoy (2015) “Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 46, pp. 546–576.
Government Accountability Oﬃce (2015) Federal Student Loans: Education Could Do More to
Help Ensure Borrowers are Aware of Repayment and Forgiveness Options, Washington DC,
GAO-15-663.
(2016) Federal Student Loans: Education needs to Improve its Income-Driven Repayment
Plan Budget Estimates, Washington DC, GAO-17-22.
Gross, Jacob PK, Osman Cekic, Don Hossler, and Nick Hillman (2009) “What Matters in Student
Loan Default: A Review of the Research Literature.,” Journal of Student Financial Aid, Vol.
39, pp. 19–29.
Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (2012) Canada Student Loans Program: An
nual Report 2010-2011.
Kaplan, Greg (2012) “Moving Back Home: Insurance Against Labor Market Risk,” Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 120, pp. 446–512.
Lochner, Lance and Alexander Monge-Naranjo (2015) “Default and Repayment among Baccalau
reate Degree Earners,” in Brad Hershbein and Kevin M. Hollenbeck eds. Student Loans and the
Dynamics of Debt, Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Chap. 8,
pp. 235–286.
(2016) “Student Loans and Repayment: Theory, Evidence, and Policy,” in
Stephen Machin Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann eds. Handbook of the Economics of
Education, Vol. 5, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, Chap. 8, pp. 397–478.
Lochner, Lance and Youngki Shin (2014) “Understanding Earnings Dynamics: Identifying and
Estimating the Changing Roles of Unobserved Ability, Permanent and Transitory Shocks,”
Working Paper.
Lochner, Lance, Todd Stinebrickner, and Utku Suleymanoglu (2013) “The Importance of Finan
cial Resources for Student Loan Repayment,” NBER Working Paper No. 19716.
36

McGarry, Kathleen (2016) “Dynamic Aspects of Family Transfers,” Journal of Public Economics,
Vol. 137, pp. 1–13.
Moﬃtt, Robert A and Peter Gottschalk (2012) “Trends in the transitory variance of male earnings
methods and evidence,” Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 47, pp. 204–236.
Nelson,
Libby
A.
(2013)
“Reimagining
Financial
Aid,”
Inside
Higher
Ed,
URL:
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/03/14/
look-all-15-reimagining-aid-design-and-delivery-reports-gates-foundation.
Nerlove, Marc (1975) “Some Problems in the Use of Income-Contingent Loans for the Finance of
Higher Education,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83, pp. 157–183.
Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary (2010) “Actuarial Report on the Canada Student Loans Program as
at 31 July 2010.”
(2014) “Actuarial Report on the Canada Student Loans Program as at 31 July 2014.”
Oliver, Melvin L. and Thomas Shapiro (1997) “Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective
on Racial Inequality,” Science and Society, Vol. 61, pp. 572–575.
Park, Youngmin (2016) “Heterogeneity in Parental Altruism and Optimal Higher Education
Subsidies,” Working Paper.
Schwartz, Saul and Ross Finnie (2002) “Student Loans in Canada: An Analysis of Borrowing
and Repayment,” Economics of Education Review, Vol. 21, pp. 497–512.

37

Percent
0 5 10 15 20 25
Percent
0 10 20 30 40
Percent
0 10 20 30 40 50

11.6

23.6

$10,000-$19,999

22.1

$20,000-$29,999

10.3

5.3
$10,000-$14,999

13.8

$30,000-$39,999

12.4

$40,000-59,999

0.6

$80,000+

$15,000-19,999

1.3

0.7

$20,000-$24,999

0.7

$50,000+

0.6

$25,000+

2.7

2.1

$30,000-$49,999

$10,000-$14,999

3.1

$20,000-$29,999

3.1

Panel B: Distribution of Expected Parental Transfers

11.8

$5,000-$9,999

$15,000-$19,999

Panel C: Distribution of Savings

$2,500-$4,999

14.1

$5,000-$9,999

$60,000-$79,999

Panel A: Distribution of Borrower's Current Annual Earnings

$1-$9,999

39.8

$1-$2,499

25.4

$1,000-$4,999

2.6

Figure 1: Distributions of Current Borrower's Earnings,
Expected Parental Transfers, and Savings

13.3

Zero

30.3

Zero

48.6

<$1,000

Figure 2: Probability of Repayment Problems at CSS by
Earnings and Additional Financial Resources
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

Has Both Savings and Parental Has Either Savings or Parental
Assistance
Assistance (Not Both)
Earnings < $20,000

Has Neither Savings nor
Parental Assistance

Earnings ≥ $20,000

Notes: `Savings' implies savings of at least $1,000. `Parental Assistance' implies expected
parental transfers of at least $2,500. Sampling weights are used.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Baseline Determinants of Repayment
Variables

Mean

Std. Error

vocational/technical school graduate or more
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans
male
age
indigenous
private for-profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type)

0.793
0.416
0.418
0.421
23.720
0.083
0.139

0.028
0.033
0.033
0.033
0.193
0.018
0.014

Notes: Based on main sample of 689 individuals with non-missing responses to baseline determinants,
current earnings, expected parental support and savings. Sample weights used in calculating all statistics.

Table 2: Repayment Problems at CSS by Earnings, Expected Parental Transfers, and Savings
Mean

Std. Error

earnings < $20,000

0.410

0.043

$20,000 ≤ earnings < $40,000

0.153

0.033

earnings ≥ $40,000

0.024

0.016

expected parental transfer < $2,500

0.322

0.032

expected parental transfer ≥ $2,500

0.105

0.032

savings < $1,000

0.437

0.042

savings ≥ $1,000

0.087

0.018

A. by current earnings

B. by expected parental support

C. by savings

Notes: Based on main sample of 689 individuals with non-missing responses to baseline variables,
current earnings, expected parental support and savings. Sample weights used in calculating all
statistics.

Table 3: Estimates for Probability of a Repayment Problem
Variables
constant
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared
vocational/technical school graduate or more
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans
male
age
indigenous
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type)
current earnings: none
current earnings: $1 to less than $10,000/year
current earnings: $10,000/year to less than $20,000/year
current earnings: $20,000/year to less than $30,000/year
current earnings: $30,000/year to less than $40,000/year
expected parental transfer ≥ $2,500
savings ≥ $1,000
has both savings ≥ $1,000 and parental transfer ≥ $2,500

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.145
(0.239)
0.143
(0.051)
-0.013
(0.010)
-0.010
(0.075)
-0.128
(0.063)
0.063
(0.052)
-0.027
(0.050)
-0.004
(0.011)
0.061
(0.105)
0.116
(0.056)

-0.514
(0.237)
0.127
(0.045)
-0.010
(0.008)
-0.004
(0.072)
-0.051
(0.064)
0.067
(0.049)
0.015
(0.049)
0.014
(0.010)
0.066
(0.104)
0.092
(0.054)
0.549
(0.092)
0.438
(0.086)
0.365
(0.067)
0.143
(0.051)
0.090
(0.058)

0.450
(0.233)
0.108
(0.045)
-0.010
(0.009)
0.008
(0.069)
-0.036
(0.059)
0.059
(0.046)
0.037
(0.047)
-0.006
(0.010)
-0.008
(0.088)
0.064
(0.056)

-0.116
(0.244)
0.097
(0.043)
-0.008
(0.008)
0.015
(0.067)
-0.002
(0.059)
0.062
(0.044)
0.054
(0.047)
0.008
(0.010)
0.002
(0.095)
0.055
(0.054)
0.449
(0.085)
0.324
(0.082)
0.259
(0.062)
0.095
(0.054)
0.097
(0.058)
-0.139
(0.043)
-0.251
(0.048)

-0.118
(0.244)
0.097
(0.043)
-0.008
(0.008)
0.019
(0.066)
-0.003
(0.058)
0.061
(0.043)
0.059
(0.047)
0.010
(0.010)
-0.010
(0.093)
0.051
(0.054)
0.440
(0.086)
0.290
(0.086)
0.241
(0.062)
0.093
(0.052)
0.085
(0.056)
-0.253
(0.082)
-0.311
(0.061)
0.195
(0.094)

-0.144
(0.044)
-0.323
(0.050)

R-squared
0.088
0.227
0.233
0.312
0.321
Notes: Linear probability model estimated using OLS. Specifications also include indicators for CSS cohort and province. Based
on main sample of 689 individuals with non-missing responses to baseline variables, current earnings, expected parental support
and savings. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4: Estimates for Probability of a Repayment Problem: Low-Earnings Borrowers
Variables

(1)

(2)

constant

0.469
(0.427)
0.241
(0.078)
-0.022
(0.013)
-0.020
(0.092)
0.155
(0.093)
0.070
(0.073)
-0.008
(0.077)
-0.003
(0.019)
0.029
(0.141)
0.083
(0.077)
0.143
(0.072)
-0.150
(0.082)
-0.376
(0.072)

0.449
(0.426)
0.247
(0.077)
-0.023
(0.012)
-0.022
(0.092)
0.166
(0.092)
0.072
(0.071)
-0.008
(0.076)
-0.001
(0.019)
0.021
(0.142)
0.082
(0.077)
0.140
(0.071)
-0.224
(0.129)
-0.413
(0.082)
0.146
(0.155)

CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared
vocational/technical school graduate or more
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans
male
age
indigenous
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type)
current earnings < $10,000/year
expected parental transfer ≥ $2,500
savings ≥ $1,000
has both savings ≥ $1,000 and parental transfer ≥ $2,500

Observations
356
356
R-squared
0.374
0.377
Notes: Linear probability models estimated using OLS. Specifications also include indicators for CSS cohort
and province. Sample includes respondents with earnings less than $20,000 per year and is restricted to those
with non-missing responses to baseline variables, current earnings, expected parental support and savings.
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1 and 2 correspond to Columns 4
and 5, respectively, of Table 3.

Table 5: Estimated Effects of Parental Income on Repayment Problems

Variables
constant
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared
vocational/technical school graduate or more
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans
male
age
indigenous
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type)
current earnings: none
current earnings: $1 to less than $10,000/year
current earnings: $10,000/year to less than $20,000/year
current earnings: $20,000/year to less than $30,000/year
current earnings: $30,000/year to less than $40,000/year
dependent student with parental income < $25,000
dependent student with parental income ≥ $25,000

R-squared
Sample Size

Full Sample

Subsample with
Expected Parental
Transfers = 0

Subsample with
Expected Parental
Transfers ≥ 0

-0.544
(0.232)
0.157
(0.046)
-0.013
(0.008)
0.010
(0.072)
-0.046
(0.064)
0.068
(0.048)
0.031
(0.048)
0.015
(0.010)
0.044
(0.098)
0.080
(0.054)
0.553
(0.089)
0.432
(0.086)
0.366
(0.067)
0.145
(0.051)
0.100
(0.058)
-0.089
(0.077)
-0.133
(0.064)

-1.469
(0.414)
0.231
(0.082)
-0.028
(0.014)
-0.084
(0.109)
-0.174
(0.123)
0.162
(0.086)
0.025
(0.085)
0.049
(0.016)
-0.173
(0.146)
0.070
(0.111)
0.670
(0.182)
0.622
(0.160)
0.589
(0.143)
0.214
(0.108)
0.189
(0.125)
-0.028
(0.121)
0.002
(0.134)

-0.192
(0.264)
0.122
(0.057)
-0.006
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.093)
0.014
(0.076)
0.054
(0.059)
0.051
(0.062)
0.001
(0.013)
0.208
(0.130)
0.074
(0.062)
0.528
(0.105)
0.402
(0.107)
0.326
(0.079)
0.138
(0.063)
0.053
(0.065)
-0.083
(0.094)
-0.142
(0.079)

0.239
689

0.373
207

0.233
482

Notes: Linear probability models for repayment problems estimated using OLS. Specifications also include indicators for
CSS cohort and province. Based on main sample of individuals with non-missing responses to baseline variables, current
earnings, expected parental support and savings. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6: Earnings by Post-Secondary Education and Years Since Leaving School (SLID)
Years since leaving post-secondary school:
1

2

3

4

5

24,709
0.214
0.441
0.683
0.825
0.906
314

27,170
0.208
0.397
0.611
0.809
0.884
238

26,274
0.182
0.385
0.540
0.830
0.916
145

31,024
0.150
0.329
0.537
0.683
0.825
94

29,077
0.174
0.294
0.486
0.674
0.928
38

38,128
0.159
0.265
0.387
0.564
0.734
182

44,245
0.016
0.160
0.296
0.462
0.661
127

42,292
0.104
0.222
0.371
0.459
0.596
86

47,341
0.051
0.163
0.377
0.474
0.580
56

48,301
0.028
0.223
0.247
0.403
0.698
26

A. Less than 4-year university degree
Average earnings
Fraction earning < $10,000/year
Fraction earning < $20,000/year
Fraction earning < $30,000/year
Fraction earning < $40,000/year
Fraction earning < $50,000/year
Number of observations
B. Received 4-year university degree
Average earnings
Fraction earning < $10,000/year
Fraction earning < $20,000/year
Fraction earning < $30,000/year
Fraction earning < $40,000/year
Fraction earning < $50,000/year
Number of observations

Notes: Sample includes individuals reporting some post-secondary borrowing, earnings, and
educational attainment from SLID Panel 5 (covering 2005-10). All estimates use sample weights.

Table 7: Calculated Rap Payment Amounts vs. Debt-Based Amounts by Post-Secondary
Education and Years Since Leaving School (SLID)
Years since leaving post-secondary school:
1

2

3

4

5

0.495
0.439
244

0.526
0.419
192

0.525
0.381
121

0.609
0.359
82

0.696
0.280
32

0.661
0.296
143

0.721
0.197
103

0.720
0.156
69

0.705
0.196
47

0.660
0.275
23

A. Less than 4-year university degree
Ratio of RAP to debt-based payment
Fraction paying zero
Number of observations
B. Received 4-year university degree
Ratio of RAP to debt-based payment
Fraction paying zero
Number of observations
C. All borrowers
Ratio of RAP to debt-based payment
0.558
0.592
0.588
0.646
0.680
Fraction paying zero
0.385
0.344
0.309
0.296
0.278
Number of observations
387
295
190
129
55
Notes: Sample includes individuals reporting some post-secondary borrowing, earnings, and
educational attainment from SLID Panel 5 (covering 2005-10). All estimates use sample weights.

Table 8: Discounted Present Value of Calculated Rap Payments vs. Debt-Based Payments (SLID)
Years since leaving post-seconary school:
Years 1-3
Years 1-4
Years 1-5
Ratio of DPV of RAP payments to debt-based payments

0.550

0.609

0.554

Percent with DPV of RAP payments...
less than or equal to 50% of debt-based payments
greater than 50% but less than 100% of debt-based payments
equal to 100% of debt-based payments

51%
10%
39%

43%
22%
35%

42%
32%
26%

Number of Observations

190

129

55

Notes: Sample includes individuals reporting post-secondary borrowing amounts, earnings, and educational
attainment from SLID Panel 5 (covering 2005-10). A discount rate of 2.1% is used to compute discounted present
values over reported post-school years. All estimates use sample weights.

